Author: Sun Young Hwang*, Geesu Lee*
| Jurisdiction: | Topics: |
I. Introduction[1]
South Korea stands at a critical juncture in addressing climate change. Its government has pledged to substantially cut greenhouse gas emissions and shift toward a sustainable, low-carbon economy. This commitment is evident in two key areas: international engagement and domestic legal mandates.
On the international stage, South Korea actively engages in multilateral climate negotiations and dialogues, including submissions before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in advisory proceedings on climate change.[2] These efforts underscore South Korea’s recognition of climate change as a global challenge and its initiative in shaping international legal norms.
Domestically, a landmark ruling by the Constitutional Court of Korea has reinforced the urgency for stronger climate action.[3] The Court found that existing measures failed to protect fundamental rights, requiring the government to implement more rigorous and concrete policies.
As South Korea progresses in its climate agenda, it also faces a growing concern shared by states pursuing similar objectives—potential conflicts between its climate obligations and legal claims from foreign investors under investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms.
This blog post explores how climate policies designed to reduce emissions and promote sustainability may be contested under ISDS provisions in international investment agreements (IIAs), including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), as well as in free trade agreements (FTAs). It then explores the delicate balance South Korea must maintain between advancing its climate goals and fulfilling its legal obligations to protect foreign investments.
II. South Korea’s Climate Action Framework
A. International Engagements
South Korea has been an active participant in global climate governance, contributing to international legal and policy frameworks.[4] As a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement, it has taken part in Conference of the Parties (COP) negotiations and backed key climate finance and development initiatives, such as the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI).
Additionally, South Korea’s submissions before ITLOS and ICJ in their recent advisory proceedings on climate change in 2023 and 2024 underscore fundamental legal principles that guide its climate policies.[5] These submissions include calls for upholding the binding nature of international climate agreements; emphasizing global collaboration in line with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC); prioritizing intergenerational equity; advocating for science-based policies; integrating sustainable development goals; acknowledging human rights linkages; highlighting the importance of adaptation measures; promoting technological innovation; and supporting the financial and capacity building of vulnerable states.
At COP29—the 29th Conference of the Parties held in November 2024—South Korea reiterated its climate commitments while introducing ongoing and new initiatives to accelerate climate action.[6] These efforts include expanding its emissions trading system, strengthening global climate transparency mechanisms, and enhancing clean energy cooperation. Looking ahead, South Korea is preparing its 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC), with plans to submit its target by September 2025, further demonstrating its continued engagement in global climate governance.[7]
B. Domestic Legal and Policy Landscape
At the national level, South Korea has established a comprehensive legal and policy framework to guide its transition toward a low-carbon future. The Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth for Coping with Climate Crisis (hereinafter the “Carbon Neutrality Act”) serves as the cornerstone of its domestic climate policy.[8]
This legislation sets a binding target of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, along with a 2030 NDC goal of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions “not less than 35 percent” compared to 2018 levels (Article 8(1) of the Carbon Neutrality Act). To achieve these objectives, the Carbon Neutrality Act incorporates various policy mechanisms, including measures to promote renewable energy, phase out fossil fuels, and develop carbon capture technologies.
However, given the substantial foreign investment in sectors directly affected by the energy transition—ranging from traditional power generation to emerging renewable energy infrastructure—South Korea’s domestic climate policies also intersect with its obligations under IIAs and FTAs.[9]
A pivotal moment in South Korea’s climate action came in August 2024, when the Constitutional Court of Korea issued a landmark ruling declaring Article 8(1) of the Carbon Neutrality Act unconstitutional.[10] The Court found that the legislation’s failure to establish specific, quantitative emission reduction targets beyond 2030 violated Article 35 of the Constitution,[11] which guarantees the right to a healthy environment, and contravened the principle of intergenerational equity by placing undue burdens on future generations.
As a result of this ruling, the National Assembly is now required to amend the law by February 2026, setting year-by-year carbon reduction targets for 2031 to 2049 to ensure a more structured and equitable emissions trajectory. This decision has far-reaching implications not only for South Korea’s domestic climate strategy but also for climate litigation across Asia, as it demonstrates the growing role of national courts in holding governments accountable for their climate obligations.
Beyond legal developments, South Korea has also taken strategic steps to advance its energy transition. In February 2025, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) finalized the 11th Basic Plan for Electric Supply and Demand, outlining the country’s energy strategy for 2024-2038.[12] This plan sets a crucial target: increasing the share of renewable energy in South Korea’s energy mix to 29.2% by 2038. By establishing clear objectives for clean energy expansion, the plan provides a structured roadmap for South Korea’s shift toward a more sustainable energy system.
III. ISDS Challenges to Climate Action
ISDS provisions in IIAs and FTAs allow foreign investors to initiate claims against host states before international arbitral tribunals for alleged breaches of treaty obligations.
As states adopt more robust climate policies, investors have increasingly invoked ISDS provisions within IIAs in response.[13] According to a 2022 study by UNCTAD, between 1987 and 2021, investor claimants brought at least 175 ISDS cases under IIAs concerning environmental protection measures. Many of these disputes were linked to measures or sectors directly relevant to climate action.[14] This trend has sparked criticism that the growing use of ISDS could have a chilling effect on domestic environmental regulations and climate policy initiatives.[15] Another 2022 study projected that government measures aimed at curbing global warming could potentially trigger over US$340 billion in ISDS claims from oil and gas investors.[16]
Among the various climate-related disputes that may arise under IIAs, three prominent types merit closer examination:[17]
- The first type of dispute arises from states’ adoption of more stringent environmental protection measures or the denial or withdrawal of project approvals and licenses on climate-related grounds. A notable example is the case brought by a Canadian energy company against the U.S. following the cancellation of the Keystone XL pipeline permit. The project, intended to transport bitumen oil from Canada to the U.S., was halted in part due to its potential environmental and climate impacts. In response, the company filed a US$15 billion claim under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).[18] Other illustrative cases include Ruby River Capital LLC v. Canada, a US$20 billion claim related to the denial of approval for a liquified natural gas facility on environmental grounds;[19] Rockhopper Exploration v. Italy, in which the tribunal awarded over €190 million to a UK oil and gas company after Italy banned offshore drilling;[20] and Oro Minerals Corp. v. Republic of Colombia, a dispute over environmental measures affecting a mining project, where the tribunal found a treaty breach with damages yet to be determined.[21]
- The second type involves disputes triggered by fossil fuel phase-out policies, such as mandated closures of coal-fired power plants or restrictions on fossil fuel exploration. A prominent example relates to the claims brought against the Netherlands under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) in response to legislation phasing out coal power plants as part of the Dutch government’s climate strategy.[22] Other cases include Westmoreland Coal Company v. Canada, in which a U.S. mining company challenged the Alberta provincial government’s decision to accelerate the deadline for implementing carbon capture technology at coal plants,[23] and Vattenfall v. Germany, where the Swedish state-owned power company contested Germany’s decision to phase out nuclear energy.[24]
- The third type of dispute concerns changes to state support schemes for renewable energy, such as reductions in feed-in tariffs or modifications to renewable energy credit systems. These regulatory shifts can lead to claims by investors who had relied on earlier incentive frameworks when structuring their projects. A representative example is Blusun v. Italy, in which a Belgian investor challenged reforms in Italy’s solar energy sector that reduced feed-in tariffs, alleging that the changes undermined the viability of their investment.[25] The 2022 UNCTAD study notes that while fossil fuel investors have historically dominated ISDS claims, the past decade has seen a notable rise in claims brought by investors in the renewable energy sector.[26]
These disputes often center on investor claims that the host state has breached the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard and/or engaged in unlawful expropriation. Investors may argue that shifts in climate-related policies violate their legitimate expectations of a stable and predictable regulatory environment. For example, in Blusun v. Italy, the claimant contended that frequent and unpredictable changes to the regulatory regime created a “regulatory turbulence,” amounting to both a violation of the FET standard and an indirect expropriation of its investments.[27]
Environmental measures that substantially diminish the value of an investment may also be framed by investors as acts of unlawful expropriation. In Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Canada, a U.S. company initiated proceedings under NAFTA after the Quebec government revoked its oil and gas exploration permits due to environmental concerns. The claimant argued that this action constituted a breach of both the minimum standard of treatment (MST) and the expropriation provisions of the treaty.[28] Similarly, in Rockhopper Exploration v. Italy, the investor claimed that the denial of a production concession amounted to an unlawful expropriation of its investment.[29]
A further illustrative case is Eco Oro Minerals Corp. v. Colombia, which involved increasing regulatory constraints on mining in the Páramos—ecologically sensitive high-altitude wetlands. These restrictions culminated in the prohibition of Eco Oro’s open-pit gold mining project. The Canadian investor brought claims under the Canada-Colombia FTA, alleging breaches of both the expropriation and MST provisions. While the tribunal found no expropriation, concluding that Colombia’s actions constituted a legitimate, non-discriminatory exercise of police powers,[30] it did find a violation of the MST.[31] Specifically, the tribunal held that Colombia’s inconsistent conduct and failure to delimit the protected Páramo region frustrated Eco Oro’s legitimate expectations of regulatory stability. This case illustrates that even non-discriminatory environmental regulations can result in MST violations when state actions are deemed inconsistent or lacking transparency.
IV. Strategic Options for Navigating ISDS Challenges
South Korea has developed an extensive network of IIAs, many of which include ISDS provisions.[32] As previously discussed, South Korea’s initiatives to implement more ambitious measures for phasing out fossil fuels and promoting renewable energy could heighten its exposure to ISDS claims. The remainder of this blog post examines strategies that South Korea can utilize to mitigate these risks and defend against potential claims, while continuing to advance its climate agenda.
A. Treaty Reform and Modernization
Several IIAs that South Korea has entered into already include carve-out provisions allowing the government to regulate in the public interest, including for environmental protection, public health, and safety.[33] South Korea could consider incorporating explicit carve-outs for bona fide climate measures aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.[34]
Even if not in the form of carve-outs, South Korea can consider explicitly clarifying in its IIAs that investment activities must be conducted in a manner that is sensitive to its environmental concerns, particularly in relation to climate change.[35] Such language would serve to expressly reaffirm and reinforce South Korea’s right to regulate in the field of climate change.[36] For instance, in Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Oman, the tribunal interpreted the reference in the U.S.-Oman FTA that “[n]either Party shall fail to effectively enforce its environmental laws” as exemplifying “the importance attached by the US and Oman to the enforcement of their respective environmental laws” and the intent “to reserve a significant margin of discretion to themselves in the application and enforcement of their respective environmental laws.”[37] The tribunal then noted that, when it comes to determining whether Oman breached the MST, it must be “guided by the forceful defence of environmental regulation and protection provided in the express language of the Treaty.”[38]
More broadly, it is important to modernize IIAs concluded in earlier decades to prevent unintended and inconsistent interpretations.[39] Older IIAs often lack specific provisions addressing environmental protection and “feature broad and vague formulations for substantive treatment standards,” which can lead to expansive tribunal interpretations that may unduly constrain legitimate climate regulation.[40]
B. Enhancing Legal Certainty and Procedural Legitimacy
As demonstrated by the cases above, regulatory stability and transparency are key components of fair treatment under international investment law. By establishing clear and consistent regulations, aligning with international standards, and fostering more transparent regulatory processes, host states can maintain an attractive investment environment while effectively addressing climate change.
At the domestic level, promptly revising the Carbon Neutrality Act to incorporate specific, quantitative post-2030 targets is critical for legal certainty. It will also be important for South Korea to communicate comprehensive and specific climate change commitments in its 2035 NDC. Both developments will provide a clear policy framework, which can reduce grounds for investors to bring claims based on frustration of expectations and arbitrary policy shifts. Adopting transparent regulations with greater stakeholder input reinforces procedural due process, which also strengthens the host state’s defenses against legal challenges. As climate mitigation measures frequently involve different levels and branches of government, it is important to ensure that different arms of the state are acting consistently, and that subnational actors who often have less awareness of specific IIA commitments are actively involved and informed.[41]
At the international level, active participation in multilateral processes enables South Korea to contribute to the progressive development of international investment law and to engage in ongoing efforts to address the challenges posed by climate change. In this vein, South Korea’s participation in the advisory opinion proceedings of both ITLOS and ICJ is highly significant. The objective and impact of these proceedings are to clarify state obligations on climate change under international law, which in turn would inform tribunals faced with the types of investment treaty claims described above.
C. Legal Defenses Against Investor Claims
If an investor challenges South Korea’s climate policies under ISDS provisions, the government’s defense would center on their inherent legitimacy. This legitimacy derives from multiple sources: constitutional obligations, potentially reinforced by the ruling of the Constitutional Court of Korea as it likely confirmed and formalized a pre-existing policy direction; obligations under the international climate change regime; and the well-established right of states to regulate in the public interest, particularly for climate change mitigation and adaptation.
A key argument would counter claims of frustrated “legitimate expectations” under FET standards. The defense would maintain that such expectations must be reasonable and context-specific, especially given the global climate crisis and the evolving legal framework supporting climate action. South Korea’s pre-existing and growing responsibilities to address climate change, along with a transparent, consultative, and good-faith policy-making process as explored above, would further undermine any claims of arbitrary or discriminatory treatment.
South Korea would emphasize that its climate policies are legitimate regulatory measures serving an urgent public concern, applied non-discriminatorily, and not amounting to indirect expropriation. The principle of systemic integration—interpreting IIAs and FTAs in harmony with international obligations, including climate agreements—would further support this defense. Additionally, circumstances that could weaken the investor’s standing or the merits of their claim, such as breaches of South Korean law or actions exacerbating the climate crisis, might be strategically presented.
V. Conclusion
South Korea’s commitment to climate action is critical; however, its obligations under IIAs and FTAs, and the risk of ISDS claims may present significant challenges. To achieve its climate goals, South Korea needs a proactive, comprehensive strategy that encompasses treaty reform and ensures domestic legal clarity to mitigate ISDS risks while preparing for legal defense against such claims. This balanced approach is essential for a successful low-carbon transition, safeguarding citizens’ rights, and contributing to global climate efforts, enabling South Korea to reconcile climate action with its international investment obligations.
[1] Sun Young Hwang and Geesu Lee contributed this blog post in their personal capacities. The opinions and analysis presented herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their respective employers. The original Korean version of this blog post has been published in Korean Commercial Arbitration Board (KCAB) Arbitration Journal Vol. 363, Spring & Summer 2025, pp. 64-77.
[2] Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law, ITLOS, Written Statement of the Republic of Korea (16 June 2023); Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, ICJ, Written Statement of the Republic of Korea (22 March 2024).
[3] Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea: Case on National Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets Addressing Climate Crisis (Constitutional Court of Korea Case No. 2020Hun-Ma389, 2021Hun-Ma1264, 2022Hun-Ma854 and 2023Hun-Ma846) Judgment (29 August 2024).
[4] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, “Multilateral Environment Diplomacy” (accessed on 1 April 2025); Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, “Korea’s Efforts to Address Climate Change” (accessed on 1 April 2025).
[5] Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law, ITLOS, Written Statement of the Republic of Korea (16 June 2023); Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, ICJ, Written Statement of the Republic of Korea (22 March 2024).
[6] UNFCCC, “COP 29 High-level Segment – National Statement – Republic of Korea” (3 December 2024).
[7] The Korea Times, “Korea to Set Greenhouse Gas Emission Goal for 2035 with UN” (24 February 2024).
[8] Framework Act on Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth for Coping with Climate Crisis (Act No. 18469).
[9] While this topic deserves separate discussion, it is noteworthy that a significant share of foreign direct investment (FDI) in South Korea is directed toward sectors likely to be impacted by climate policies. Energy-intensive manufacturing may face higher costs from carbon pricing and the need for technological upgrades. The energy sector is also evolving, with limits on conventional sources and a growing focus on renewables and hydrogen. See, e.g., Macquarie, “From K-Pop to the KOSPI: Trends Shaping South Korea’s Economy” (21 February 2025); Santander, “South Korea: Foreign Investment” (accessed on 1 April 2025).
[10] Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Do-Hyun Kim et al. v. South Korea: Case on National Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets Addressing Climate Crisis (Constitutional Court of Korea Case No. 2020Hun-Ma389, 2021Hun-Ma1264, 2022Hun-Ma854 and 2023Hun-Ma846) Judgment (29 August 2024).
[11] Constitution of the Republic of Korea (Amended by Constitution No. 10, 29 October 1987).
[12] See Suk-yee Jung, “11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply Passes National Assembly Committee”, Business Korea (20 February 2025).
[13] See IPCC, “Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change” (2022), Ch. 14, pp. 1505-1506 (“A large number of bilateral and multilateral agreements, including the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, include provisions for using a system of [ISDS] designed to protect the interests of investors in energy projects from national policies that could lead their assets to be stranded. Numerous scholars have pointed to ISDS being able to be used by fossil-fuel companies to block national legislation aimed at phasing out the use of their assets …”). See also the report of the Special Rapporteur on human rights to a healthy environment, “Paying Polluters: The Catastrophic Consequences of Investor-State Dispute Settlement for Climate and Environment Action and Human Rights” (13 July 2023). Some governments, such as Denmark and New Zealand, have expressed that the threat of ISDS claims has constrained their ability to adopt more ambitious climate policies. Ellizabeth Meager, “COP26 Targets Pushed Back Under Threat of Being Sued”, Capital Monitor (14 January 2022).
[14] UNCTAD, “Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases and Climate Action” (September 2022).
[15] Kyla Tienhaara, “Regulatory Chill and the Threat of Arbitration: A View from Political Science” in Evolution in Investment Treaty Law and Arbitration edited by Chester Brown and Kate Miles, Cambridge University Press (December 2011).
[16] Kyla Tienhaara, Rachel Thrasher, Blake Alexander Simmons and Kevin Gallagher, “Investor-State Disputes Threaten the Global Green Energy Transition”, Science (5 May 2022).
[17] While there is no single, universally accepted definition of climate change-related disputes, a report by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Commission defines the term broadly “to include any dispute arising out of or in relation to the effect of climate change and climate change policy, the [UNFCCC] and the Paris Agreement.” ICC Commission on Arbitration and ADR, “Resolving Climate Change Related Disputes through Arbitration and ADR” (November 2019), p. 8.
[18] In 2024, the tribunal determined in a jurisdictional ruling that the claim cannot proceed. TC Energy Corporation and TransCanada Pipelines Limited v. United States of America (ICSID Case No. ARB/21/63) Award (12 July 2024), para. 219.
[19] Ruby River Capital LLC v. Canada (ICSID Case No. ARB/23/5) Request for Arbitration (17 February 2023), para. 167.
[20] Rockhopper Italia S.p.A., Rockhopper Mediterranean Ltd and Rockhopper Exploration Plc v. Italy (ICSID Case No. ARB/17/14) Award (23 August 2022), para. 335. Italy applied to ICSID to annul the award. See Rockhopper Exploration Plc, “Request by Italy for Annulment of ICSID Award” (31 October 2022).
[21] Eco Oro Minerals Corp. v. Republic of Colombia (ICSID Case No. ARB/16/41) Award (15 July 2024), para. 920.
[22] Uniper SE, Uniper Benelux Holding B.V. and Uniper Benelux N.V. v. Kingdom of the Netherlands (ICSID Case No. ARB/21/22) Claimants’ Memorial (20 May 2022); RWE AG and RWE Eemshaven Holding II BV v. Kingdom of the Netherlands (ICSID Case No. ARB/21/4) Request for Arbitration (20 January 2021). Both arbitral proceedings have been discontinued.
[23] Westmoreland Coal Company v. Canada (ICSID Case No. UNCT/23/2) Award (17 December 2024); Westmoreland Mining Holdings, LLC v. Canada (ICSID Case No. UNCT/20/3) Award (31 January 2022).
[24] Vattenfall AB and others v. Federal Republic of Germany (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/12) Discontinuance Order (9 November 2021). The case was discontinued after settlement.
[25] Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italy (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3) Award (26 December 2016).
[26] UNCTAD, “Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Settlement Cases and Climate Action” (September 2022).
[27] Blusun S.A., Jean-Pierre Lecorcier and Michael Stein v. Italy (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/3), Award (26 December 2016), para. 320.
[28] Lone Pine Resources Inc. v. Canada (ICSID Case No. UNCT/15/2), Award (21 November 2022), para. 263.
[29] Rockhopper Italia S.p.A., Rockhopper Mediterranean Ltd and Rockhopper Exploration Plc v. Italy (ICSID Case No. ARB/17/14), Award (23 August 2022), paras. 169, 199.
[30] Eco Oro Minerals Corp. v. Republic of Colombia (ICSID Case No. ARB/16/41) Award (15 July 2024), paras. 698, 699.
[31] Eco Oro Minerals Corp. v. Republic of Colombia (ICSID Case No. ARB/16/41) Award (15 July 2024), paras. 805, 821.
[32] Junu Kim, Woojae Kim, and Bochan Kim, “Investment Treaty Arbitration: South Korea”, Global Arbitration Review (updated on 8 July 2024).
[33] See, e.g., Korea-European Union Free Trade Agreement (2010), Article 7.50 (“nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by either Party of measures … (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; (c) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are applied in conjunction with restrictions on domestic investors or on the domestic supply or consumption of services …”); Korea-Uzbekistan BIT (2019), Article 17; Korea-Armenia BIT (2018), Annex I, Article 3(b).
[34] See Joshua Paine and Elizabeth Sheargold, “A Climate Change Carve-Out for Investment Treaties”, Journal of International Economic Law (7 March 2023); Joshua Paine and Elizabeth Sheargold, “Carving-out Climate Action from Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Suggested Treaty Language and Commentary”, OECD (23 February 2024).
[35] Cf. Australia-United Kingdom Free Trade Agreement (2021), Article 22.2(3) (providing that each State has the right “to establish its own levels of domestic environmental protection and its own priorities relating to the environment, including climate change, and to establish, adopt or modify its environmental laws and policies accordingly.”).
[36] See UAB E Energija (Lithuania) v. Republic of Latvia (ICSID Case No. ARB/12/33) Award (22 December 2017), para. 836; Invesmart v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules) Award (26 June 2009), para. 498; Infinito Gold Ltd. v. Republic of Costa Rica (ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5) Award (3 June 2021), para. 777. See also Christina Hioureas, Diem Ho and Daniel Zaleznik, “Thawing the ‘Regulatory Chill’ Effects of ISDS Claims” BCDR International Arbitration Review Volume 9, Issue 2 (2022) pp. 361-384; Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Commission of Small Island States on Climate Change and International Law, ITLOS, Oral Statement of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Verbatim Record, ITLOS/PV.23/C31/12 (19 September 2023); Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, ICJ, Oral Statement of the Republic of The Gambia, Verbatim Record, CR 2024/49 (11 December 2024).
[37] Abel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Osman (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33) Award (3 November 2015), paras. 388-389.
[38] Abel A Hamadi Al Tamimi v. Sultanate of Osman (ICSID Case No. ARB/11/33) Award (3 November 2015), para. 389.
[39] UNCTAD, “Phase 2 of IIA Reform: Modernizing the Existing Stock of Old-Generation Treaties” (June 2017).
[40] UNCTAD, “The International Investment Treaty Regime and Climate Action” (September 2022), p. 3.
[41] See Joshua Paine and Elizabeth Sheargold, “A Climate Change Carve-Out for Investment Treaties”, Journal of International Economic Law (7 March 2023).
* Sun Young Hwang is an associate in the International Litigation and Arbitration Department at Foley Hoag LLP. Her practice focuses on representing and advising sovereign States on matters of public international law and international investment law.
* Geesu Lee is an Associate Legal Officer at the International Court of Justice. His professional interests center on public international law and international dispute settlement.