Author: Hamza Cherfaoui*
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Bankruptcy and impecuniosity fall under different legal regimes and follow different logics. Whereas the notion of impecuniosity has been developed and constructed progressively by arbitration case law, the notion of bankruptcy is, for its part, the subject of complex and sophisticated regulation, governed not only by the Commercial Code but also by the whole body of French codes and regulations that deal, directly or indirectly, with business difficulties. It should be noted in this regard that only impecuniosity in an arbitration context will be the focus of this article.
The opening of insolvency proceedings may lead to the impecuniosity of the bankrupt debtor and, consequently, jeopardise its ability to pay the costs of the arbitration and, ultimately, its ability to access justice, whether arbitral or state.
This article sets out to examine, from the perspective of French law, this complex phenomenon, whose practical and theoretical significance is undeniable. In other words, the main aim is to determine to what extent a bankrupt debtor may rely on the rules progressively forged by arbitration case law on impecuniosity in order to obtain effective access to justice, whether arbitral or state.
In order to provide the most comprehensive overview of the question, it is first necessary to examine how bankruptcy law and arbitration law approach the notion of impecuniosity. Indeed, behind this same term lie two notions that refer to different legal realities.
Secondly, it is necessary to study the evolution of this notion, the current state of positive law and the prospects for its future development.
I – Impecuniosity in a bankruptcy context
- Divergent conceptions. The notion of impecuniosity may take on different meanings depending on whether one approaches it from the standpoint of arbitration law or from that of bankruptcy law.
The French conception of impecuniosity adopted in arbitration law is of undeniable interest to the bankrupt debtor, since the question is to what extent the bankrupt debtor may rely on the mechanisms specific to arbitral litigation in order to preserve its access to justice.
A – The divergent understanding of impecuniosity
- The approach to impecuniosity in bankruptcy law. In bankruptcy law, this notion refers to specific situations, strictly defined and governed by Articles L. 663-3, R. 663-41, L. 645-1, L. 645-9 and R. 645-1 of the Commercial Code. It in fact covers two distinct situations. The first concerns what the Commercial Code calls an “impecunious case” (dossier impécunieux). This situation arises when, in professional recovery proceedings (rétablissement professionnel), in judicial liquidation or upon the conversion of proceedings into judicial liquidation, the realisation of the debtor’s assets does not cover the costs of the insolvency proceedings and, consequently, does not make it possible to remunerate the officers of the proceedings, in particular the creditors’ representative (mandataire judiciaire) and the judicial liquidator (Arts. L. 663-3 and R. 663-41 of the Commercial Code)[1]. To remedy this difficulty, the legislature established a specific mechanism, the Fund for the Financing of Impecunious Cases (Fonds de financement des dossiers impécunieux – FDDI). The purpose of this fund is to ensure the remuneration of the officers of the proceedings in impecunious cases. It is financed by the interest that the Caisse des dépôts et consignations earns on the sums made available to creditors’ representatives and judicial liquidators (Arts. L. 663-3, R. 663-41, R. 663-43, R. 663-46, R. 663-48 and R. 663-50)[2]. Secondly, impecuniosity is also one of the conditions for opening professional recovery proceedings, commonly referred to as the impecuniosity condition[3].
- The approach to impecuniosity in arbitration law. By contrast, from the standpoint of arbitration law, the notion of impecuniosity covers a reality entirely different from that of bankruptcy law.
Arbitration is not free justice. Naturally, in order to benefit from it, one must pay the costs of the arbitration, which include in particular the arbitrators’ fees, the arbitral institution’s costs and counsel’s fees. Yet it is not uncommon for one of the parties to be unable to bear these sometimes considerable costs, which may place it in a situation of impecuniosity and, consequently, obstruct its effective access to justice[4].
Unfortunately, the notion of impecuniosity in arbitration law is, to date, the subject of neither a statutory definition nor specific treatment by the legislature[5]. That is why legal scholars have endeavoured, in the absence of a precise definition, to determine its contours. The notion is, moreover, often described as diffuse, subjective or even devoid of genuine legal content[6]. However, despite this lack of definition, the various scholarly approaches converge on the same idea: linking impecuniosity to a party’s lack of financial capacity to bear the costs of the arbitration, which may potentially give rise to a risk of denial of justice[7].
B – The relevance of impecuniosity for the bankrupt debtor
- The complex reality of impecuniosity in arbitration. However, this seemingly simple definition in fact conceals a much more complex reality. First, impecuniosity does not concern only parties traditionally regarded as economically weak, such as employees or consumers. It may also affect professionals, commercial companies, and natural or legal persons, whether solvent (in bonis) or subject to insolvency proceedings[8]. It may even affect public entities, in particular States in the context of investment arbitration[9]. In other words, impecuniosity does not depend on the status of the party, but on its actual capacity to bear the cost of the arbitral proceedings.
Secondly, impecuniosity may arise at different stages of arbitral litigation. It may occur as early as the commencement of the proceedings, when one of the parties is unable to pay the initial advance required for the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. In that case, the proceedings may be paralysed even before the arbitrators have been appointed. But it may also arise during the proceedings, in particular when one of the parties wishes to submit additional claims or counterclaims[10]. Indeed, under most arbitration rules, the submission of such claims entails the payment of a supplementary advance or of additional fees requested by the arbitral institution or by the arbitral tribunal[11].
In practice, impecuniosity arises mainly in institutional arbitration. This is explained by the existence, in the rules of most of the major international arbitration centres, such as the ICC[12], the LCIA[13], the “Triple A” (AAA)[14], the SIAC[15], the DIAC[16], the HKIAC[17], CIETAC[18], the OHADA CCJA[19], CIMAC[20], the CAS[21] or WIPO[22]…, of provisions making access to the arbitral tribunal, as well as the submission of principal, additional or counterclaims, conditional upon the prior payment of an advance on the costs of arbitration. Failing payment of this advance, the claims concerned are deemed withdrawn[23].
- The relevance of the arbitration-law notion of impecuniosity for the bankrupt debtor. Finally, although the notions of impecuniosity and bankruptcy may coincide in certain situations, they must not be confused. As several authors have rightly pointed out, impecuniosity is not inherent in the opening of insolvency proceedings. Indeed, a state of impecuniosity may exist just as much in a debtor subject to insolvency proceedings as in a solvent person (in bonis)[24]. To be convinced of this, one need only note that several judgments of the Cour de cassation and of the lower courts have dealt with the impecuniosity of parties that were not subject to insolvency proceedings[25]. But there are also decisions concerning the impecuniosity of debtors against whom insolvency proceedings had been opened[26].
In this second situation, an essential question arises: how can the debtor in difficulty rely on the rules on impecuniosity, progressively forged by arbitration case law, in order to protect its rights and, where appropriate, obtain effective access to justice, whether arbitral or state?
In other words, when one of the parties is unable to pay the advance required for the arbitral proceedings to go ahead and is, as a result, deprived of the possibility of accessing the arbitral tribunal, does this situation constitute an infringement of the right of access to a court guaranteed by Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights? Does such an infringement then allow the debtor in difficulty to bring the matter before the state courts?
Or must, on the contrary, the parties’ original intention as expressed in the arbitration agreement be respected and the competence-competence principle preserved, on which the entire system of arbitration rests?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to trace the evolution of the notion of impecuniosity as it has been progressively constructed by arbitration case law. This evolution is far from complete. On the contrary, the notion is currently undergoing major upheavals as a result of the draft reform of the Arbitration Code, which will completely transform and reshape the treatment of situations of impecuniosity[27].
II – The evolution of the notion of impecuniosity in arbitration law
- The evolution of the notion of impecuniosity in arbitration law. The notion of impecuniosity has undergone a particularly profound evolution over the past twenty years. The case-law record for the period 2005-2025 is impressive. In the space of twenty years, the courts have progressively built a genuine legal regime of impecuniosity.
A – From emergence to maturity
- The period of uncertainty and absence of case law. The research of Professor de Fontmichel and Professor Clavel-Thoraval has shown how rare judicial decisions on the question of impecuniosity were, from both the lower courts and the Cour de cassation, until the 2010s[28]. Indeed, since the 1990s, the debate has mainly developed around the judgments of the ECtHR, in the search for a balance between two fundamental requirements: on the one hand, the right of access to justice enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and, on the other, respect for the parties’ legitimate expectations as expressed in the arbitration agreement and, consequently, for the competence-competence principle. This situation made the positive law on impecuniosity unpredictable and uncertain[29].
So much so that Professor Gaillard wrote at the time: “In France, there are only few decisions of state courts dealing with impecuniosity in the context of arbitration, which makes it necessary to speculate on the subject.”[30]
- The beginnings of the case-law evolution. It was in the Croissanterie judgment, handed down by the Paris Court of Appeal on 14 April 2005[31], that one of the first decisions on impecuniosity came into being. In that case, the dispute concerned a judicial liquidator who was unable to pay the costs of the arbitration. Under the arbitration rules, this situation resulted in the draft provisional award becoming final. Yet, when seised of an action to set aside, and although it had a perfect opportunity to rule on the consequences of impecuniosity, the Court of Appeal simply ignored this argument, holding that this complaint was unrelated to the characterisation of the arbitral tribunal’s decision[32].
It was only from 2011 onwards that the creation and development of positive law on impecuniosity in arbitration wouldtruly accelerate. In the Mil Tek case, decided by the Paris Commercial Court on 17 May 2011[33], the court declared an arbitration agreement ineffective because of the inability of an insolvent French company to pay the costs of arbitration before the Copenhagen Arbitration Chamber. The court held that there was a “material impossibility (…) owing to a contractual clause that constitutes a restriction of access to justice, which must lead the court to declare this obligation null and void”[34]. This decision attracted considerable scholarly criticism, in particular because of its potential impact on the binding force of the arbitration agreement and on the competence-competence principle[35].
- The growth phase of the notion of impecuniosity. Following this decision, the pace of decisions handed down by the lower courts gradually accelerated, thereby helping to shape a new face of the positive law on impecuniosity.
First, the Paris Court of Appeal, in its Pirelli judgment[36], set aside an arbitral award that had deemed the counterclaims of a company in judicial liquidation withdrawn for failure to pay the advance requested[37]. This judgment was appealed to the Cour de cassation and was, moreover, the first opportunity for the Cour de cassation to rule on the question of impecuniosity. The Cour de cassation quashed the appellate judgment, holding that while a refusal to examine counterclaims is liable to infringe the right of access to a judge and, consequently, to justify setting aside the award, those counterclaims must still be inseparable from the principal claim[38].
Although this was the Cour de cassation’s first stance on impecuniosity, the judgment remains relatively disappointing, as it does not yield a genuine criterion clearly identifying the conditions under which impecuniosity may justify calling into question the competence-competence principle and the effectiveness of the arbitration agreement. Interpreting this decision, some authors have reasoned a contrario that challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal remained possible. In other words, where the counterclaims are separable from the principal claim, a party’s impecuniosity could, in certain circumstances, lead to the setting aside of the award, or even to the inapplicability of the arbitration agreement[39].
The question of impecuniosity, however, found its first guiding principle only with the Lola Fleurs judgment, handed down by the Paris Court of Appeal on 26 February 2013. The court laid down two fundamental rules. First: “The manifestly inapplicable nature of the arbitration clause cannot be inferred from the alleged inability (…) to bear the costs of such proceedings (…) and from the resulting denial of justice.”[40] Secondly, the court added an important clarification: it is for the “arbitral tribunal to allow access to the judge”, failing which its award is liable to be set aside.However, this latter rule has evolved through the case law of the lower courts. Today, the obligation to ensure effective access to arbitral justice no longer rests exclusively with the arbitral tribunal, but also with all the actors in the arbitration, whether the parties, the arbitral institution or any person involved in the arbitral process[41].
This guiding principle was, however, only endorsed by the Cour de cassation in 2016, with the ATE judgment. The Court provided an essential clarification: “the manifest inapplicability of an arbitration clause (cannot be inferred from the mere) alleged inability of a party, even one placed in judicial liquidation, to bear the costs of the arbitral proceedings”[42].
In other words, the impecuniosity that allows a departure from the competence-competence principle cannot be inferred from the mere fact that insolvency proceedings have been opened. Likewise, the opening of insolvency proceedings does not, in itself, render the arbitration agreement ineffective or inapplicable. This guiding principle subsequently became the leading line of case law, guiding both the lower courts and the Cour de cassation in dealing with situations of impecuniosity[43].
- The shortcomings of the case-law evolution. Although this principle is now firmly established, the evolution of the case law and the analysis of the decisions handed down by the lower courts and the Cour de cassation show that the burden of proving impecuniosity lies with the party invoking it[44]. Several authors have inferred from this case law that recourse to the state courts in cases of impecuniosity is not entirely closed, but remains subject to demonstrating the impecunious party’s genuine inability to bear the costs of the arbitral proceedings[45].
The problem is that the case law did not really specify what makes it possible to characterise an impecuniosity serious enough to justify a departure from the competence-competence principle. Indeed, if even the opening of insolvency proceedings is not, in itself, sufficient to establish a situation of impecuniosity, it is legitimate to ask what more must be proven.
The system developed at that time by French case law was open to criticism. It required impecuniosity to be demonstrated while failing to specify exactly what had to be proven, thereby rendering impecuniosity litigation unpredictable and uncertain[46]. In other words, the real difficulty lay in identifying the criterion or the evidence making it possible to determine from what degree of impecuniosity a party may obtain a departure from the competence-competence principle and, consequently, bring proceedings before the state courts despite the existence of an arbitration agreement.
For years, the French courts, both the lower courts and the Cour de cassation, adopted a resolutely pro-arbitration approach and rejected almost every type of evidence put forward to establish impecuniosity[47]. The arguments thus rejected included judicial liquidation[48], the argument based on limited financial means[49], a reversal of fortune[50]and the excessive or prohibitive cost of arbitration[51]. Several decisions thus followed one another over the years without it being possible to identify an operational evidentiary criterion making it possible to characterise an impecuniosity serious enough to override the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal[52].
- The phase of maturity of the notion of impecuniosity. It was not until 2022, with the Tagli’apau[53] and CPP Le Mans judgments, that a reliable evidentiary criterion finally emerged for characterising an impecuniosity capable of justifying a departure from the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal: that “of a prior attempt to initiate arbitral proceedings that remained without remedy” [54].
In the CPP Le Mans case, a franchise agreement containing an arbitration agreement had been concluded. Instead of referring the matter to the arbitral tribunal, the franchisee decided to bring proceedings directly before the state courts, on the ground that it lacked the financial means needed to bear the costs of arbitration. The first-instance court, considering that the franchisee could not in fact access arbitration, upheld its jurisdiction despite the existence of the arbitration agreement. The Paris Court of Appeal declared that it lacked jurisdiction. On appeal, the Cour de cassation restated the principle laid down in the ATE judgment, but added an important clarification. It held that where the party invoking its impecuniosity does not demonstrate that it first attempted to implement the arbitral procedure and that this attempt remained without remedy in the face of the financial difficulties encountered, the principle remains that impecuniosity is not, in itself, sufficient to render the arbitration agreement ineffective[55].
Several authors have seen in this judgment an opening, or even a potential exception, to the competence-competence principle. In other words, the state courts could set aside the arbitration agreement and call into question the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal only on condition that the party invoking its impecuniosity demonstrates that it has exhausted all attempts or steps to access arbitral justice despite its financial difficulties[56].
Thus, the Cour de cassation now seems to be seeking a balance between, on the one hand, the binding force of the arbitration agreement and, on the other, the fundamental right of access to justice[57]. Some authors consider that this evolution will lead arbitral institutions to adapt their practices and rules. In particular, provisions stating that a claim for which no advance has been paid will be deemed withdrawn may have to evolve, the risk being that the dispute escapes them and is ultimately brought before the state courts[58]. We now have a clearer regime for determining when it is possible to depart from the competence-competence principle on grounds of impecuniosity.
Nevertheless, this judgment remains resolutely pro-arbitration and, in practice, makes it particularly difficult to establish an impecuniosity serious enough to justify a departure from the competence-competence principle In this respect, Professor de Fontmichel has proposed several solutions for remedying situations of impecuniosity, such as reducing arbitrators’ fees, the creation by arbitral institutions of funds to finance impecunious parties, or recourse to third-party funding of the arbitration[59]. The question that therefore arises is whether the impecunious party must try and exhaust every possible remedy before being able to turn to the state courts. To date, this question remains unanswered by the Cour de cassation.
Ultimately, it must be acknowledged that French case law remains, on the whole, favourable to arbitration. Decisions of the lower courts declaring the arbitration agreement ineffective remain, in this respect, particularly rare and isolated[60].
B – Future prospects for evolution in light of the reform of the Arbitration Code
- Future prospects for evolution with the draft reform of the Arbitration Code. The question of impecuniosity is currently undergoing a particularly interesting development with the draft reform of the Arbitration Code, in particular its Article 33. This reform calls into question well-established case law that prohibited the supporting judge (juge d’appui) from interfering in questions of impecuniosity, which until now have fallen within the assessment of the lower courts[61].
The draft reform intends to entrust the supporting judge with the task of seeking a solution to situations of impecuniosity. The objective is clear: to prevent a case from ultimately being brought before the state courts because of the financial difficulties of one of the parties[62]. The supporting judge thus becomes an additional step in the process, tasked with examining all means capable of preserving the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal and guaranteeing effective access to arbitral justice[63].
Thus, in the current state of positive law, the impecuniosity regime can be summarised in two steps. The first consists in requiring the actors in the arbitration to seek and exhaust all solutions enabling the impecunious party to effectively access the arbitral tribunal. The second comes into play if these efforts fail: the impecunious party may then turn to the state courts to have it established that the solutions considered did not remedy the situation of impecuniosity[64].
The draft reform seeks to add an intermediate step. After the failure of the attempts made by the actors in the arbitration to remedy the impecuniosity, the supporting judge will have to be seised so that it may, in turn, try to find a solution to this situation of impecuniosity. Only if the supporting judge’s intervention fails will the impecunious party potentially be able to bring proceedings before the lower courts to have it established that no solution could be found and, where appropriate, gain access to state justice[65].
Ultimately, in the new configuration that will be enshrined by the draft reform of the Arbitration Code, case law will certainly be awaited on how the supporting judge will go about resolving the question of impecuniosity.
*Hamza Cherfaoui is a PhD candidate at Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, where he conducts doctoral research on “The Impact of Insolvency on Arbitration” under the supervision of Professor François-Xavier Lucas. He also serves as a teaching assistant at the Sorbonne Law School, where he teaches Private International Law and Insolvency Law.
He holds a Master’s degree in Business Law from the Sorbonne Law School, as well as previous postgraduate degrees in Business Law from Hassan II University of Casablanca (Aïn Chock). His academic background is further complemented by specialised training in arbitration, insolvency and corporate restructuring, private international law, and business law.
Hamza has gained professional experience through several internships in law firms and in-house legal departments in Paris and Casablanca. His work has involved legal negotiations, contract drafting, dispute management, and due diligence, providing him with practical exposure to a range of business law matters
[1] P.-M. LE CORRE, Droit et pratique des procédures collectives, 13th ed., Dalloz, 2025, p. 921, 922 and 923; Francis Lefebvre, Entreprises en difficulté, coll. Dossiers pratiques, ed., Francis Lefebvre, 2019, Nos. 186 and 910; A. JACQUEMONT, N. BORGA and TH. MASTRULLO, Droit des entreprises en difficulté, 12th ed., LexisNexis, 2022, p. 563.
[2] F.-X. LUCAS, Manuel de droit de la faillite, 6th ed., PUF, 2025, p. 78.
[3] It refers to the economic situation of a debtor whose declared assets have a market value of less than EUR 15,000 (C. Com., Arts. L. 645-1, L. 645-9 and R. 645-1 of the Commercial Code); see also: F.-X. LUCAS and M. SÉNÉCHAL, “La procédure d’enquête pour le rétablissement professionnel (PERP)”, D., 2013, p. 1852; F.-X. LUCAS, Manuel de droit de la faillite, 6th ed., PUF, 2025, p. 83; Francis Lefebvre, Entreprises en difficulté, coll. Dossiers pratiques, ed., Francis Lefebvre, 2019, No. 910.
[4] J.-B. RACINE, “Procédure collective et Procédure arbitrale : l’impossible cohabitation ?”, lecture, Les MARDis du CMAP, 8 March 2024; J.-B. RACINE, Droit de l’arbitrage, ed., PUF Thémis, 2016, p. 404.
[5] M. DE FONTMICHEL, Le faible et l’arbitrage, coll. Recherches juridiques, ed., Economica, 2013, p. 177 and 275; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023; F.-X. TRAIN, “Impécuniosité et accès à la justice dans l’arbitrage international (à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 17 November 2011 dans l’affaire LP v. Pirelli)”, Rev. arb., 2012, No. 2, p. 267; P. CAPELLE, L’arbitrage collectif, coll. Nouvelle Bibliothèque de Thèses, ed., Dalloz, 2022, p. 227, 230 and 231.
[6] P. CAPELLE, L’arbitrage collectif, coll. Nouvelle Bibliothèque de Thèses, ed., Dalloz, 2022, p. 228; K. SACHS, “La protection de la partie faible en arbitrage”, Gaz. Pal., 17 July 2007, p. 22; E. LOQUIN, “Accès à la justice et impécuniosité de l’une des parties à l’arbitrage”, RTD com., 2023, p. 571; M. DE FONTMICHEL, Le faible et l’arbitrage, coll. Recherches juridiques, ed., Economica, 2013, p. 175; E. LOQUIN, “Arbitrage. – Institutions d’arbitrage”, Fasc. 1800-20, JurisClasseur Procédure civile, ed., LexisNexis, 13 December 2023; F.-X. TRAIN, “Impécuniosité et accès à la justice dans l’arbitrage international (à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 17 November 2011 dans l’affaire LP v. Pirelli)”, Rev. arb., 2012, No. 2, p. 267.
[7] “In the context of arbitration, impecuniosity must be understood as a party’s lack of financial capacity to resort to arbitration.” in M. DE FONTMICHEL, Le faible et l’arbitrage, coll. Recherches juridiques, ed., Economica, 2013, p. 175. ; “It is the total or partial financial inability of a party to resort to arbitral proceedings.” in P. CAPELLE, L’arbitrage collectif, coll. Nouvelle Bibliothèque de Thèses, ed., Dalloz, 2022, p. 227. “Impecuniosity is defined as a disproportion between the costs of a trial and the applicant’s financial means. Thus, economic denial of justice is established whenever the comparison shows that the cost of the arbitration represents ‘an excessive burden for the applicant’” in J. CLAVEL-THORAVAL, “Présentation de la proposition de réforme du droit de l’arbitrage”, Revue Lamy Droit civil,. No. 242, December 2025. ; “Impecuniosity (…) is understood as a subjective and concrete notion referring to the concept of disproportion between an individual’s resources and the costs he or she must bear in order to access a judge.” in J. CLAVEL-THORAVAL, Le déni de justice économique dans l’arbitrage international. L’effet négatif du principe de compétence-compétence, doctoral thesis, Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas, 2011, p. 311. ; “it refers to a party to an arbitration agreement that does not have the capacity to finance the arbitration to which it has committed.” in K. SACHS, “La protection de la partie faible en arbitrage”, Gaz. Pal., 17 July 2007, p. 22. ; “The impecunious party (…) designates any person (…) who is in a situation of financial incapacity either to commence an arbitration, as claimant, or to defend and in particular to raise counterclaims, as respondent” in J. EL AHDAB and D. MAINGUY, Droit de l’arbitrage : Théorie et pratique, ed., LexisNexis, 2021, p. 266 and 267. See also: N. DISSAUX, “L’arbitrage, l’argent et l’accès au juge”, D., 2022, p. 2022; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023; B. CHARLET, “L’office du juge étatique saisi par un plaideur impécunieux, en présence d’une clause compromissoire”, Cah. dr. entr., No. 1, January-February 2024, dossier 8.; K. SACHS, “La protection de la partie faible en arbitrage”, Gaz. Pal., 17 July 2007, p. 22; J. BILLEMONT and M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’approche contentieuse – Le juge arbitral”, Cah. dr. entr., No. 1, January-February 2024, dossier 7; L. LARRIBÈRE, “Codifier pour autonomiser : la proposition de Code de l’arbitrage”, Gaz. Pal., No. 14, 15 April 2025, p. 12; O. STAES, ““Procès” économique. Les limites au caractère dérogatoire”, in Le droit des entreprises en difficulté après 30 ans : droit dérogatoire, précurseur ou révélateur ?, IFR Actes de colloques No. 30, Presses de l’Université Toulouse 1 Capitole, 2017; J.-B. RACINE, “Procédure collective et Procédure arbitrale : l’impossible cohabitation ?”, lecture, Les MARDis du CMAP, 8 March 2024.
[8] “Impecuniosity affects not only parties traditionally regarded as weak, such as the consumer, the employee or the insured, but all potential actors in arbitration.” in P. CAPELLE, L’arbitrage collectif, coll. Nouvelle Bibliothèque de Thèses, ed., Dalloz, 2022, p. 227. ; See also: J. EL AHDAB and D. MAINGUY, Droit de l’arbitrage : Théorie et pratique, ed., LexisNexis, 2021, p. 266; F.-X. TRAIN, “Impécuniosité et accès à la justice dans l’arbitrage international (à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 17 November 2011 dans l’affaire LP v. Pirelli)”, Rev. arb., 2012, No. 2, p. 267; E. LOQUIN, “Accès à la justice et impécuniosité de l’une des parties à l’arbitrage”, RTD com., 2023, p. 571; M. DE FONTMICHEL, Le faible et l’arbitrage, coll. Recherches juridiques, ed., Economica, 2013, p. 174; E. LOQUIN, “Arbitrage. – Institutions d’arbitrage”, Fasc. 1800-20, JurisClasseur Procédure civile, ed., LexisNexis, 13 December 2023; J. CLAVEL-THORAVAL, Le déni de justice économique dans l’arbitrage international. L’effet négatif du principe de compétence-compétence, doctoral thesis, Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas, 2011, p. 97; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023.
[9]“Impecuniosity thus refers to multiple and varied situations (…), apparently including States themselves, as evidenced by the worrying sovereign debt crisis.” in F.-X. TRAIN, “Impécuniosité et accès à la justice dans l’arbitrage international (à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 17 November 2011 dans l’affaire LP v. Pirelli)”, Rev. arb., 2012, No. 2, p. 267; J. EL AHDAB and D. MAINGUY, Droit de l’arbitrage : Théorie et pratique, ed., LexisNexis, 2021, p. 115. ; “Some arbitral institutions have set up financial assistance funds to help impecunious litigants. This is the case, for example, of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague (the purpose of this fund being to assist the poorest States).” in J.-B. RACINE, Droit de l’arbitrage, ed., PUF Thémis, 2016, p. 86.
ICSID, decision on provisional measures, 18 Dec. 1984, case No. ARB/84/1, Atlantic Triton Company Limited v. People’s Revolutionary Republic of Guinea: “Although almost unanimously States are the parties who request security for costs, there is at least one case, Atlantic Triton v Guinea, in which it was the investor who requested it, arguing that the State would be unwilling or unable to pay an adverse award” in H. ABDULKAREEM, S. BATIFORT and M. PENADÉS, “IBA Report on Insolvency and Investment Arbitration”, draft by the IBA Arbitration Committee’s Insolvency and Arbitration Working Group, September 2024, p. 90.
[10] “Yet, in arbitration, the constitution of the arbitral tribunal is also conditional upon payment of the advance on costs, in particular when the proceedings are administered by an arbitral institution.” in P.-C. KAMGAING, “L’impécuniosité du demandeur à l’arbitrage n’est pas, en soi, de nature à caractériser l’inapplicabilité manifeste d’une clause compromissoire”, LPA, 31 Jan. 2024, No. LPA202t2; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023; J.-B. RACINE, Droit de l’arbitrage, ed., PUF Thémis, 2016, p. 404; J. BILLEMONT and M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’approche contentieuse – Le juge arbitral”, Cah. dr. entr., No. 1, January-February 2024, dossier 7; C. SERAGLINI, P. GIRAUD and L. JANDARD, “Droit de l’arbitrage”, JCP G, No. 6, 13 February 2023, doctr. 221; T. CLAY and M. DE FONTMICHEL, Code de l’arbitrage commenté, ed., LexisNexis, 2021, p. 268; T. LAURIOL and J. HAGE CHAHINE, “Demandes manifestement excessives et demandeur impécunieux à l’arbitrage : quels remèdes ?”, JCP G, No. 22, 6 June 2022, act. 670; E. LOQUIN, “Arbitrage. – Compétence arbitrale. – Conflit entre la compétence arbitrale et la compétence judiciaire”, Fasc. 1800-60, ed., LexisNexis 30 July 2021.
[11] M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023; T. LAURIOL and J. HAGE CHAHINE, “Demandes manifestement excessives et demandeur impécunieux à l’arbitrage : quels remèdes ?”, JCP G, No. 22, 6 June 2022, act. 670; X. DELPECH, “Demande conventionnelle en matière d’arbitrage”, Dalloz actualité, 8 Apr. 2013; C. SERAGLINI, P. GIRAUD and L. JANDARD, “Droit de l’arbitrage”, JCP G, No. 6, 13 February 2023, doctr. 221; J.-B. RACINE, Droit de l’arbitrage, ed., PUF Thémis, 2016, p. 404.
[12] ICC Rules, Art. 37, § 6: “When a request for an advance on costs has not been complied with, the Secretary General may, after consultation with the arbitral tribunal, direct it to suspend its work and set a time limit […] on the expiry of which the relevant claims shall be considered as withdrawn”
[13] LCIA Rules, Art. 24.8: “Failure by a claiming, counterclaiming or crossclaiming party to make promptly and in full any required payment may be treated by the LCIA Court or the Arbitral Tribunal as a withdrawal from the arbitration of the claim, counterclaim or crossclaim respectively, thereby removing such claim, counterclaim or cross-claim (as the case may be)”
[14] Arbitration Rules of the “American Arbitration Association”, ICDR, Art. 39, § 3.
[15] SIAC Rules, Art. 34.6, b).
[16] DIAC Rules, Appendix I, Art. 3.4.
[17] HKIAC Rules, Art. 4.6.
[18] CIETAC Rules, Art. 13.4.
[19] CCJA-OHADA Arbitration Rules, Art. 11.4.
[20] CIMAC Rules, Art. 42.8.
[21] CAS Rules, Art. R64.2.
[22] WIPO Rules, Arts. 69, d), and 70, e).
[23] M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023.
[24] P.-C. KAMGAING, “L’impécuniosité du demandeur à l’arbitrage n’est pas, en soi, de nature à caractériser l’inapplicabilité manifeste d’une clause compromissoire”, LPA, 31 Jan. 2024, No. LPA202t2; F.-X. TRAIN, “Impécuniosité et accès à la justice dans l’arbitrage international (à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 17 November 2011 dans l’affaire LP v. Pirelli)”, Rev. arb., 2012, No. 2, p. 267; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’insolvabilité du liquidateur face à l’efficacité de la convention d’arbitrage”, JCP G, No. 39, 26 September 2016, act. 1002; K. SACHS, “La protection de la partie faible en arbitrage”, Gaz. Pal., 17 July 2007, p. 22; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023; P. CAPELLE, L’arbitrage collectif, coll. Nouvelle Bibliothèque de Thèses, ed., Dalloz, 2022, p. 227; M. DE FONTMICHEL, Le faible et l’arbitrage, coll. Recherches juridiques, ed., Economica, 2013, p. 174; E. LOQUIN, “Accès à la justice et impécuniosité de l’une des parties à l’arbitrage”, RTD com., 2023, p. 571.
[25] See, e.g.: Cass. 1re civ., 13 Dec. 2017, No. 16-22.131, Garoubé v. Cameroon, CA Paris, 19 Oct. 2021, No. 18/01254, CA Paris, ch. com., 23 Nov. 2021, No. 19/15670, Accessoires Company v. Guess Europe, Cass. 1re civ., 28 Sept. 2022, No. 21-21.738, CPP Le Mans and Cass. 1re civ., 17 May 2023, No. 21-24.106, Monster Energy v. Sainte Claire.
[26] See, e.g.: CA Paris, 17 Nov. 2011, No. 09/ 24158, Cass. 1re civ., 28 March 2013, No. 11-27.770, Pirelli v. Licensing Projects, Cass. 1re civ., 13 July 2016, No. 15-19.389, ATE, Cass. 1re civ., 9 Feb. 2022, No. 21-11.253, Tagli’Apau and Cass. 1re civ., 27 Sept. 2023, No. 22-19.859, Lavau v. L’Orange Bleue.
[27] F. ANCEL and T. CLAY (eds.), “Rapport et propositions de réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage”, Working Group on the Reform of French Arbitration Law, submitted to the Minister of Justice, March 2025, p. 53, 54, 66 and 93; J. CLAVEL-THORAVAL, “Présentation de la proposition de réforme du droit de l’arbitrage”, Revue Lamy Droit civil,. No. 242, December 2025; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’articulation de la protection des parties faibles avec la convention d’arbitrage à la lumière d’une décennie d’application du décret”, Rev. arb., 2022, No. 1, p. 49-79.; T. CLAY, “Arbitrage et modes amiables de règlement des conflits (November 2024 – December 2025)”, D., 2025, p. 2195; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023.
[28] “It emerges from the case law of the Cour de cassation that the Court recognises and prohibits the risk of denial of justice, and that it recognises the notion of impecuniosity and the existence of economic denial of justice in the context of conflicts of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the situation of denial of justice in its economic aspect seems to be overlooked in French international arbitration, even though it calls for a response from our law, since procedural international public policy is at stake.” in J. CLAVEL-THORAVAL, Le déni de justice économique dans l’arbitrage international. L’effet négatif du principe de compétence-compétence, doctoral thesis, Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas, 2011, p. 71 and 72. ; “The legal grounds enabling an impecunious party to defeat an arbitration clause are uncertain. If there are many of them, it is because in reality none prevails or commands unanimity. The courts have had occasion to deal with the problem and have made it possible to identify solutions. These are not uniform and are sometimes even contradictory and/or non-existent” in M. DE FONTMICHEL, Le faible et l’arbitrage, coll. Recherches juridiques, ed., Economica, 2013, p. 132,174 and 179.
[29] See, e.g.: ECtHR, 21 Feb. 1975, No. 4451/70, Golder v. United Kingdom, ECtHR, 9 Oct. 1979, No. 6289/73, Airey v. Ireland, ECtHR, 28 Oct. 1998, No. 22924/93, Aït-Mouhoub v. France and ECtHR, 19 June 2001, No. 28249/95, Kreuz v. Poland… etc. ; See also: P. MAYER, “Partie impécunieuse et arbitrage, lois de police et arbitrage”, JDI, No. 2, April-May-June 2022, var. 3; L. WEILLER, “L’ordre public procédural dans l’arbitrage”, Cah. arb., July 2025, p. 615; N. DISSAUX, “L’arbitrage, l’argent et l’accès au juge”, D., 2022, p. 2022; M. DE FONTMICHEL, Le faible et l’arbitrage, coll. Recherches juridiques, ed., Economica, 2013, p. 143, 178 and 293; J. CLAVEL-THORAVAL, Le déni de justice économique dans l’arbitrage international. L’effet négatif du principe de compétence-compétence, doctoral thesis, Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas, 2011, p. 98.
[30] E. GAILLARD, “Impecuniosity of Parties and its Effect on Arbitration – A French View”, in Financial Capacity of Parties, German Institute of Arbitration – Peter Lang, 2004; K. SACHS, “La protection de la partie faible en arbitrage”, Gaz. Pal., 17 July 2007, p. 22; F.-X. TRAIN, “Impécuniosité et accès à la justice dans l’arbitrage international (à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 17 November 2011 dans l’affaire LP v. Pirelli)”, Rev. arb., 2012, No. 2, p. 267.
[31] CA Paris, 14 Apr. 2005, Strebler v. La Croissanterie, Gaz. Pal., 22 Oct. 2005, p. 42, note A. MOURRE and P. PEDONE
[32] M. DE FONTMICHEL, Le faible et l’arbitrage, coll. Recherches juridiques, ed., Economica, 2013, p. 183; J. CLAVEL-THORAVAL, Le déni de justice économique dans l’arbitrage international. L’effet négatif du principe de compétence-compétence, doctoral thesis, Université Paris II Panthéon-Assas, 2011, p. 291; P. CAPELLE, L’arbitrage collectif, coll. Nouvelle Bibliothèque de Thèses, ed., Dalloz, 2022, p. 228 and 220; E. LOQUIN, “La partie impécunieuse et les conséquences de l’impossibilité pour elle de payer les frais d’arbitrage”, RTD com., 2006, p. 308.
[33] T. com. Paris, 17 May 2011, No. 2011003447, Mil Tek
[34] T. CLAY, “Arbitrage et modes alternatifs de règlement des litiges”, D., 2013, p. 2936.
[35] T. CLAY, “Arbitrage et modes alternatifs de règlement des litiges”, D., 2013, p. 2936; P.-C. KAMGAING, “L’impécuniosité du demandeur à l’arbitrage n’est pas, en soi, de nature à caractériser l’inapplicabilité manifeste d’une clause compromissoire”, LPA, 31 Jan. 2024, No. LPA202t2; T. CLAY and M. DE FONTMICHEL, Code de l’arbitrage commenté, ed., LexisNexis, 2021, p. 78 and 268.
[36] CA Paris, pôle 1, ch. 1, No. 09/24158, Licensing Projects S.L. (LP) v. Pirelli & C. SpA.
[37] F.-X. TRAIN, “Impécuniosité et accès à la justice dans l’arbitrage international (à propos de l’arrêt de la Cour d’appel de Paris du 17 November 2011 dans l’affaire LP v. Pirelli)”, Rev. arb., 2012, No. 2, p. 267; T. LAURIOL and J. HAGE CHAHINE, “Demandes manifestement excessives et demandeur impécunieux à l’arbitrage : quels remèdes ?”, JCP G, No. 22, 6 June 2022, act. 670; J.-B. RACINE, Droit de l’arbitrage, ed., PUF Thémis, 2016, p. 404; T. CLAY and M. DE FONTMICHEL, Code de l’arbitrage commenté, ed., LexisNexis, 2021, p. 268; M. RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, Arbitrage international. Droit et pratique. Tome 2 – Partie générale et partie spéciale. Arbitrages d’investissements, de droit international public, irano-américains, CNUDCI, de matières premières, sport en ligne, ed. Bruylant, 2019, p. 1355.
[38] Cass. 1re civ., 28 March 2013, No. 11-27.770
[39] J. CLAVEL-THORAVAL, “Présentation de la proposition de réforme du droit de l’arbitrage”, Revue Lamy Droit civil,. No. 242, December 2025; T. CLAY and M. DE FONTMICHEL, Code de l’arbitrage commenté, ed., LexisNexis, 2021, p. 183 and 184; J.-B. RACINE, Droit de l’arbitrage, ed., PUF Thémis, 2016, p. 404.
[40] CA Paris, 26 Feb. 2013, No. 12/12953, SARL Lola Fleurs v. Sté Monceau Fleurs, SARL La Générale des Végétaux and Sté Global Export BV, ASA Bull., vol. 31, No. 4, 2013, p. 900-903 ; See also: P. MAYER, “Partie impécunieuse et arbitrage, lois de police et arbitrage”, JDI, No. 2, April-May-June 2022, var. 3; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’insolvabilité du liquidateur face à l’efficacité de la convention d’arbitrage”, JCP G, No. 39, 26 September 2016, act. 1002; N. DISSAUX, “L’arbitrage, l’argent et l’accès au juge”, D., 2022, p. 2022; T. CLAY and M. DE FONTMICHEL, Code de l’arbitrage commenté, ed., LexisNexis, 2021, p. 69, 78 and 298.
[41] CA Paris, ch. com. int., pôle 5, ch. 16, 29 June 2021, No. 20/01304, C.M.R.T v. Sofema, Cah. arb., 2022, p. 119, note P. PEDONE, CA Paris, ch. com. int., pôle 5, ch. 16, 19 Oct. 2021, No. 19/23071, Magpower Soluções de Energia v. Heliotrop, CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 4, 20 Oct. 2021, No. 21/06054, Carrefour Proximité France v. CSF, Cah. arb., 2022, p. 119, note P. PEDONE and CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 4, 30 June 2021, No. 21/02568, Carrefour Proximité France and CSF France v. CPP Le Mans Distribution, Selima et al. ; See also: M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023; L. WEILLER, “Arbitrage – Priorité à l’arbitrage, même en cas d’impécuniosité !”, Procédures, No. 11, November 2022, comm. 249; B. CHARLET, “L’office du juge étatique saisi par un plaideur impécunieux, en présence d’une clause compromissoire”, Cah. dr. entr., No. 1, January-February 2024, dossier 8; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’articulation de la protection des parties faibles avec la convention d’arbitrage à la lumière d’une décennie d’application du décret”, Rev. arb., 2022, No. 1, p. 49-79.; C. SERAGLINI, P. GIRAUD and L. JANDARD, “Droit de l’arbitrage”, JCP G, No. 6, 13 February 2023, doctr. 221; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’insolvabilité du liquidateur face à l’efficacité de la convention d’arbitrage”, JCP G, No. 39, 26 September 2016, act. 1002; B. CHARLET, “L’office du juge étatique saisi par un plaideur impécunieux, en présence d’une clause compromissoire”, Cah. dr. entr., No. 1, January-February 2024, dossier 8.
[42] Cass. 1re civ., 13 July 2016, No. 15-19.389, SELAFA MJA (ATE) v. Sté Airbus Helicopters and Airbus Helicopters Deutschland.
It should be added that the ATE case provided an important clarification regarding waiver of arbitration where the state courts are seised. In that case, the liquidator had cleverly argued that the opposing party, by seising the state courts through its proof of claim, had waived its right to rely on the arbitration agreement.
This reasoning was rejected by the Court of Appeal. The filing of a proof of claim, required by the mandatory rules of bankruptcy law, cannot be regarded as a waiver of arbitration by the parties and does not prejudge the jurisdiction or the mission of the arbitrators.
While waiver of the arbitration clause may be implicit and, consequently, be inferred from the seising of the state courts, it must nevertheless be certain and unequivocal. It must, moreover, concern a claim on the merits capable of being submitted to the arbitral tribunal. CA Paris, pôle 1, ch. 1, 7 Apr. 2015, No. 15/00512 ; see also: Cass. plén., 4 February 2011, No. 09-14.619 and Cass. com., 23 May 2024, No. 23-12.133
[43] P. MAYER, “Partie impécunieuse et arbitrage, lois de police et arbitrage”, JDI, No. 2, April-May-June 2022, var. 3; L. WEILLER, “Arbitrage – Priorité à l’arbitrage, même en cas d’impécuniosité !”, Procédures, No. 11, November 2022, comm. 249; D. BENSAUDE, “Impécuniosité et inapplicabilité manifeste de la clause d’arbitrage”, Gaz. Pal., 15 November 2016, p. 36; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’insolvabilité du liquidateur face à l’efficacité de la convention d’arbitrage”, JCP G, No. 39, 26 September 2016, act. 1002; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’articulation de la protection des parties faibles avec la convention d’arbitrage à la lumière d’une décennie d’application du décret”, Rev. arb., 2022, No. 1, p. 49-79.; J.-B. RACINE, “Procédure collective et Procédure arbitrale : l’impossible cohabitation ?”, lecture, Les MARDis du CMAP, 8 March 2024.
[44] See, e.g.: CA Paris, 11 Sept. 2018, No. 16/19913, Subway, D. 2018, p. 2448, obs. Th. CLAY, CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 4, Feb. 2019, No. 18-10343, X v. KVIK A/S, a Danish company, Cah. arb., 2019, No. 3, p. 116, note P. PEDONE, T. com. Paris, 26 Oct. 2021, No. 2021025262, A v. Exane, Cah. arb., 2022, p. 119, note P. PEDONE and Cass. 1re civ., 26 Jan. 2022, No. 21-12.479, Electrolux Home Care Products Inc ; See also: M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023; T. CLAY and M. DE FONTMICHEL, Code de l’arbitrage commenté, ed., LexisNexis, 2021, p. 71; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’articulation de la protection des parties faibles avec la convention d’arbitrage à la lumière d’une décennie d’application du décret”, Rev. arb., 2022, No. 1, p. 49-79.; J. JOURDAN-MARQUES, “L’impécunieux, l’accès au juge et la compétence du tribunal arbitral”, AJ contrat, 2018, p. 491; L. WEILLER, “Arbitrage – Confirmation de l’indifférence de l’état d’impécuniosité du demandeur pour l’application de l’effet négatif du principe compétence-compétence”, Procédures, December 2023, No. 12, comm. 324.
[45] “A party’s impecuniosity during the proceedings is liable to call into question the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal. It must be proven, in particular by taking into account the cost of the arbitral proceedings and counsel’s fees, weighed against the financial situation of the party. In the present case, this impecuniosity is not established” in J. JOURDAN-MARQUES, “L’impécunieux, l’accès au juge et la compétence du tribunal arbitral”, AJ contrat, 2018, p. 491. “the Paris Court of Appeal (…) thus left the door ajar to the possibility of one day deciding that the clause was, if not void, at least inapplicable.” in P. MAYER, “Partie impécunieuse et arbitrage, lois de police et arbitrage”, JDI, No. 2, April-May-June 2022, var. 3; L. WEILLER, “Arbitrage – Confirmation de l’indifférence de l’état d’impécuniosité du demandeur pour l’application de l’effet négatif du principe compétence-compétence”, Procédures, December 2023, No. 12, comm. 324.
[46] CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 4, Feb. 2019, No. 18-10343, X v. KVIK A/S, a Danish company, Cah. arb., 2019, No. 3, p. 116, note P. PEDONE, CA Paris, pôle 1, ch. 1, 2 June 2020, No. 17/18900, Subway and T. com. Paris, 26 Oct. 2021, No. 2021025262, A v. Exane, Cah. arb., 2022, p. 119, note P. PEDONE,
[47]“French law remains an almost impregnable bastion of the binding force of the arbitration agreement between professionals, even when that agreement is challenged in light of the right of access to arbitral justice.” in M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’articulation de la protection des parties faibles avec la convention d’arbitrage à la lumière d’une décennie d’application du décret”, Rev. arb., 2022, No. 1, p. 49-79.; P. MAYER, “Partie impécunieuse et arbitrage, lois de police et arbitrage”, JDI, No. 2, April-May-June 2022, var. 3.
[48]Cass. 1re civ., 13 July 2016, No. 15-19.389, SELAFA MJA (ATE) v. Sté Airbus Helicopters and Airbus Helicopters Deutschland ; See also: E. LOQUIN, “Accès à la justice et impécuniosité de l’une des parties à l’arbitrage”, RTD com., 2023, p. 571; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’insolvabilité du liquidateur face à l’efficacité de la convention d’arbitrage”, JCP G, No. 39, 26 September 2016, act. 1002; P.-M. LE CORRE, Droit et pratique des procédures collectives, 13th ed., Dalloz, 2025, p. 1971; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’articulation de la protection des parties faibles avec la convention d’arbitrage à la lumière d’une décennie d’application du décret”, Rev. arb., 2022, No. 1, p. 49-79.; E. LOQUIN, “Arbitrage. – Institutions d’arbitrage”, Fasc. 1800-20, JurisClasseur Procédure civile, ed., LexisNexis, 13 December 2023; P. CAGNOLI, “Arbitrage et insolvabilité”, Rev. proc. coll., No. 2, March-April 2017, comm. 9.
[49]“Impecuniosity does not, indeed, constitute a criterion capable of establishing the manifest inapplicability of an arbitration clause, and it is for the actors in the arbitration to rule out any risk of denial of justice vis-à-vis a litigant with limited financial means.” in CA Paris, ch. com. int., pôle 5, ch. 16, 29 June 2021, No. 20/01304, C.M.R.T v. Sofema, Cah. arb., 2022, p. 119, note P. PEDONE and CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 4, 30 June 2021, No. 21/02568, Carrefour Proximité France and CSF France v. CPP Le Mans Distribution, Selima et al.
[50] “Finally, as regards the infringement of the right of access to a judge, the prohibitive cost of arbitral proceedings and the impecuniosity of the parties are not such as to defeat the competence-competence principle.” in CA Nîmes, 11 Jan. 2018, No. 16-04503, X Papeterie Presse v. AJC, Cah. arb., 2018, p. 113, note P. PEDONE.
[51]“Finally, as regards the infringement of the right of access to a judge, the prohibitive cost of arbitral proceedings and the impecuniosity of the parties are not such as to defeat the competence-competence principle.” The reversal of fortune faced by certain parties cannot, finally, have the effect of rendering the arbitration agreement manifestly inapplicable (…)” in CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 16, 19 Oct. 2021, No. 19/23071, Magpower Soluções de Energia v. Heliotrop, Cah. arb., 2022, p. 119, note P. PEDONE et CA Paris, 26 Feb. 2013, No. 12/12953, SARL Lola Fleurs v. Sté Monceau Fleurs, SARL La Générale des Végétaux and Sté Global Export BV, ASA Bull., vol. 31, No. 4, 2013, p. 900-903 ; See also: T. CLAY and M. DE FONTMICHEL, Code de l’arbitrage commenté, ed., LexisNexis, 2021, p. 69.
[52] CA Nîmes, 11 Jan. 2018, No. 16-04503, X Papeterie Presse v. AJC, Cah. arb., 2018, p. 113, note P. PEDONE, CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 4, Feb. 2019, No. 18-10343, X v. KVIK A/S, a Danish company, Cah. arb., 2019, No. 3, p. 116, note P. PEDONE, CA Paris, pôle 1, ch. 1, 2 June 2020, No. 17/18900, Subway, CA Paris, ch. com. int., pôle 5, ch. 16, 29 June 2021, No. 20/01304, C.M.R.T v. Sofema, Cah. arb., 2022, p. 119, note P. PEDONE, CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 4, 30 June 2021, No. 21/02568, Carrefour Proximité France and CSF France v. CPP Le Mans Distribution, Selima et al., CA Montpellier, ch. com., 19 Oct. 2021, No. 18/06223, Coxco Capestang v. Aecg Finexcom, Cah. arb., 2022, p. 119, note P. PEDONE, CA Paris, ch. com. int., pôle 5, ch. 16, 19 Oct. 2021, No. 18/01254, SARL Sainte Claire v. Monster Energy Company, CA Paris, pôle 5, ch. 4, 20 Oct. 2021, No. 21/06054, Carrefour Proximité France v. CSF, Cah. arb., 2022, p. 119, note P. PEDONE, CA Paris, ch. com. int., pôle 5, ch. 16, 29 June 2021, No. 20/01304, C.M.R.T v. Sofema, Cah. arb., 2022, p. 119, note P. PEDONE, T. com. Paris, 26 Oct. 2021, No. 2021025262, A v. Exane, Cah. arb., 2022, p. 119, note P. PEDONE and Cass. 1re civ., 26 Jan. 2022, No. 21-12.479.
“The difficulty is also explained by the paradox that exists in the impecuniosity system created by French case law.
On the one hand, Article 1448 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down a clear principle: the only exception to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal lies in the manifest nature of the nullity or inapplicability of the arbitration agreement. In other words, what is required is a nullity or inapplicability that is obvious at first sight, a self-evident matter that does not call for a particularly elaborate demonstration.
On the other hand, establishing a situation of impecuniosity requires precisely the opposite. It calls for an in-depth analysis of the debtor’s capacity to bear the costs of the arbitration.
One is therefore legitimately led to ask the following question: if the mere opening of insolvency proceedings is not, in itself, sufficient to establish the manifest nature of the impecuniosity and, consequently, to render the arbitration agreement manifestly ineffective, what exactly must then be demonstrated?
In other words, on the one hand, a demonstration of the obvious is required. But on the other, in-depth proof of impecuniosity is demanded. Therein lies the whole difficulty of the system.” ; See also: P. CAPELLE, L’arbitrage collectif, coll. Nouvelle Bibliothèque de Thèses, ed., Dalloz, 2022, p. 231; PH. FOUCHARD, “La coopération du Président du Tribunal de grande instance à l’arbitrage”, Rev. arb., 1985, p. 27; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’insolvabilité du liquidateur face à l’efficacité de la convention d’arbitrage”, JCP G, No. 39, 26 September 2016, act. 1002; J.-B. RACINE, “Procédure collective et Procédure arbitrale : l’impossible cohabitation ?”, lecture, Les MARDis du CMAP, 8 March 2024; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023.
[53] Cass. 1re civ., No. 21-11.253, Tagli’apau ; Although the Tagli’apau judgment holds inadmissible the attempt to rely on the arbitration clause in a context of impecuniosity, this solution was not based on impecuniosity itself, but on a distinct ground, that of procedural fairness (loyauté procédurale).
In that case, the claimant was in judicial liquidation. Despite this situation, it had paid its share of the advance on costs. The respondent, by contrast, had refused to pay its share. Strict application of the ICC Rules meant that, as long as the advance had not been paid in full, all claims were deemed withdrawn.
Faced with this deadlock, the claimant, which was subject to insolvency proceedings, seised the state courts. But the respondent once again objected to the jurisdiction of the state courts on the ground of the existence of the arbitration agreement.
In other words, on the one hand, it paralysed the arbitral proceedings by refusing to pay its share of the advance; on the other, it blocked access to the state courts by invoking the arbitration agreement. The Cour de cassation regarded this manoeuvre as procedural unfairness, declaring inadmissible the party seeking to rely on the arbitration agreement in such circumstances. ; See also: M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023; L. LARRIBÈRE, “L’effet négatif du principe de compétence-compétence ne saurait être mis en échec en raison de la seule impécuniosité d’une des parties au litige”, Gaz. Pal., 8 November 2022, No. GPL441z0; P.-C. KAMGAING, “L’impécuniosité du demandeur à l’arbitrage n’est pas, en soi, de nature à caractériser l’inapplicabilité manifeste d’une clause compromissoire”, LPA, 31 Jan. 2024, No. LPA202t2; P. MAYER, “Partie impécunieuse et arbitrage, lois de police et arbitrage”, JDI, No. 2, April-May-June 2022, var. 3; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’articulation de la protection des parties faibles avec la convention d’arbitrage à la lumière d’une décennie d’application du décret”, Rev. arb., 2022, No. 1, p. 49-79.
[54] Cass. 1re civ., 28 Sept. 2022, No. 21-21.738, CPP Le Mans.
[55] Y. STRICKLER and F.-X. LICARI, “ARBITRAGE – Convention d’arbitrage – Art. 2059 à 2061”, JCl. Civil, Fasc. 20, ed., LexisNexis, 22 August 2024; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023.
[56] “it may be considered that, where (…) the commencement of the arbitral proceedings was indeed attempted by the impecunious party without the actors in the arbitration having managed to remedy the situation, the manifest inapplicability of the arbitration agreement could then, where appropriate, be discussed” in L. WEILLER, “Arbitrage – Priorité à l’arbitrage, même en cas d’impécuniosité !”, Procédures, No. 11, November 2022, comm. 249; C. SERAGLINI, P. GIRAUD and L. JANDARD, “Droit de l’arbitrage”, JCP G, No. 6, 13 February 2023, doctr. 221; N. DISSAUX, “L’arbitrage, l’argent et l’accès au juge”, D., 2022, p. 2022; L. LARRIBÈRE, “L’effet négatif du principe de compétence-compétence ne saurait être mis en échec en raison de la seule impécuniosité d’une des parties au litige”, Gaz. Pal., 8 November 2022, No. GPL441z0.
[57] Cass. 1re civ., 27 Sept. 2023, No. 22-19.859, Lavau ; See also: L. WEILLER, “Arbitrage – Confirmation de l’indifférence de l’état d’impécuniosité du demandeur pour l’application de l’effet négatif du principe compétence-compétence”, Procédures, December 2023, No. 12, comm. 324; P. GIRAUD, “Impécuniosité d’une partie : créativité, subsidiarité et pragmatisme”, Rev. arb., 2023, p. 157; P.-C. KAMGAING, “L’impécuniosité du demandeur à l’arbitrage n’est pas, en soi, de nature à caractériser l’inapplicabilité manifeste d’une clause compromissoire”, LPA, 31 Jan. 2024, No. LPA202t2; Y. STRICKLER and F.-X. LICARI, “ARBITRAGE – Convention d’arbitrage – Art. 2059 à 2061”, JCl. Civil, Fasc. 20, ed., LexisNexis, 22 August 2024.
[58] M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023; P.-C. KAMGAING, “L’impécuniosité du demandeur à l’arbitrage n’est pas, en soi, de nature à caractériser l’inapplicabilité manifeste d’une clause compromissoire”, LPA, 31 Jan. 2024, No. LPA202t2.
[59] M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023; T. LAURIOL and J. HAGE CHAHINE, “Demandes manifestement excessives et demandeur impécunieux à l’arbitrage : quels remèdes ?”, JCP G, No. 22, 6 June 2022, act. 670; B. CHARLET, “L’office du juge étatique saisi par un plaideur impécunieux, en présence d’une clause compromissoire”, Cah. dr. entr., No. 1, January-February 2024, dossier 8; P.-C. KAMGAING, “L’impécuniosité du demandeur à l’arbitrage n’est pas, en soi, de nature à caractériser l’inapplicabilité manifeste d’une clause compromissoire”, LPA, 31 Jan. 2024, No. LPA202t2; F. ANCEL and T. CLAY (eds.), “Rapport et propositions de réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage”, Working Group on the Reform of French Arbitration Law, submitted to the Minister of Justice, March 2025, p. 54.
[60] See, e.g.: T. com. Paris, 17 May 2011, No. 2011003447, Mil Tek and T. com. Paris, 13 Oct. 2020, RG No. 2017005123, D. 2020, pan. 2484, obs. T. CLAY ; There has been a debate as to the level at which the sanction for impecuniosity should operate. Should it be imposed at the level of the award, by setting aside an award that disproportionately infringes the right of access to justice, or at the level of the arbitration agreement?
The question also arises as to the legal consequence for the arbitration agreement when a court recognises that one party’s impecuniosity justifies, and allows, its access to state justice. Is it nullity, lapse (caducité), termination or some other sanction?
The lower courts have tended to pronounce, or at least to discuss, the sanction of nullity. Several authors, by contrast, advocate lapse (caducité) as the most appropriate sanction.
The question has not yet been resolved. Indeed, total nullity of the arbitration agreement would result in its annihilation for any future dispute, whereas inapplicability or lapse produce more limited effects (cf. infra…). ; See also: T. CLAY, “Arbitrage et modes alternatifs de règlement des litiges”, D., 2013, p. 2936; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’arbitrage et l’impécuniosité”, lecture, Les MARDIs du CMAP, 4 July 2023; L. WEILLER, “L’ordre public procédural dans l’arbitrage”, Cah. arb., July 2025, p. 615; P. MAYER, “Partie impécunieuse et arbitrage, lois de police et arbitrage”, JDI, No. 2, April-May-June 2022, var. 3.
[61] Cass. 1re civ., 13 Dec. 2017, No. 16-22.131, Garoubé v. Cameroon and TJ Paris, ch. des référés, 1 Feb. 2024, RG No. 23/59274 ; See also: H. BARBIER, “Contestation par la partie impécunieuse du retrait de ses demandes par un centre d’arbitrage : compétence du juge de droit commun et non du juge d’appui”, Cah. arb., 1 October 2017, p. 701; M. DE FONTMICHEL, “L’articulation de la protection des parties faibles avec la convention d’arbitrage à la lumière d’une décennie d’application du décret”, Rev. arb., 2022, No. 1, p. 49-79.
[62] F. ANCEL and T. CLAY (eds.), “Rapport et propositions de réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage”, Working Group on the Reform of French Arbitration Law, submitted to the Minister of Justice, March 2025, p. 54 and 93; J.-Y. GARAUD, “Commentaires sur le projet de réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage”, Cah. arb., April 2025, p. 345; M. HENRY, “Projet de réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage”, Cah. arb., April 2025, p. 361.
[63] Article 33 of the draft Arbitration Code: “In the event of the impecuniosity of one of the parties effectively depriving it of access to the arbitral tribunal and where, as the case may be, the arbitral institution has not found a solution allowing the proceedings to be maintained under its auspices, the supporting judge may be seised by a party for the purpose of ordering any measure capable of enabling the arbitration to proceed.” Thus, the choice of the seat of arbitration is becoming increasingly important and will have to be the subject of hard-fought negotiations. Indeed, although Article 37, 4°, of the draft Arbitration Code enshrines the solution laid down in the NIOC judgment and confers particularly broad jurisdiction on the supporting judge, it should be noted that this judgment was handed down in the specific context of the appointment of arbitrators. Cass. 1re civ., 1 Feb. 2005, No. 01-13.742, NIOC. But nothing prevents this provision from being interpreted in favour of situations of impecuniosity. Such an interpretation is all the more justified since impecuniosity may also give rise to a risk of denial of justice.
Moreover, research has already shown that the treatment of situations of impecuniosity varies considerably from one country to another, depending on the court seised.
By way of illustration, Germany adopts an approach diametrically opposed to that of France.
It considers, in principle, that the impecuniosity of one of the parties automatically renders the arbitration clause incapable of being performed. See in this regard: M. DE FONTMICHEL, Le faible et l’arbitrage, coll. Recherches juridiques, ed., Economica, 2013, p. 130 and 173-187.; P. CAPELLE, L’arbitrage collectif, coll. Nouvelle Bibliothèque de Thèses, ed., Dalloz, 2022, p. 237‑242.
[64] P. GIRAUD, “Impécuniosité d’une partie : créativité, subsidiarité et pragmatisme”, Rev. arb., 2023, p. 157; C. SERAGLINI, P. GIRAUD and L. JANDARD, “Droit de l’arbitrage”, JCP G, No. 6, 13 February 2023, doctr. 221.
[65] J.-Y. GARAUD, “Commentaires sur le projet de réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage”, Cah. arb., April 2025, p. 345; M. HENRY, “Projet de réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage”, Cah. arb., April 2025, p. 361; S. HENRY and J. EL HAGE, “Centre d’arbitrage, convention et sentence : réflexions sur les propositions de réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage”, Cah. arb., April 2025, p. 369; E. LOQUIN and D. MOURALIS, “Le projet de réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage”, RTD com., 2025, p. 603; J. CLAVEL-THORAVAL, “Présentation de la proposition de réforme du droit de l’arbitrage”, Revue Lamy Droit civil,. No. 242, December 2025; P. MAYER, “Quelques commentaires sur le projet de réforme du droit français de l’arbitrage”, Cah. arb., April 2025, p. 407.
