Author: Devanshu Sajlan*
| Jurisdiction: | Topics: |
The landscape of international arbitration is built upon the pillars of party autonomy and the finality of arbitral awards. However, this foundation is not absolute. Courts worldwide play a crucial role in ensuring the fairness of the arbitral process and safeguarding against fundamental injustices. The Indian Supreme Court’s decision in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. (DMRC) v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. (DAMEPL)[1] has sparked considerable debate, with some critics suggesting an overly interventionist approach towards arbitration awards. This analysis will delve into the intricacies of the DMRC v. DAMEPL dispute and draw compelling parallels with cases such as Hoteles v. Union in the United States (US) and UK Home Office v. Raytheon in the United Kingdom (UK), to consider whether the criticism is fair.[2]
1. From Metro Rails to Court Halls: The DMRC-DAMEPL Saga
The DMRC v. DAMEPL dispute originated from a Concession Agreement signed on August 25, 2008, under a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model for the Airport Metro Express Line in New Delhi.[3] DMRC handled land acquisition, civil structures, and regulatory clearances, while DAMEPL managed the design, supply, installation, testing, and commissioning of railway systems.[4] After operations began, DAMEPL identified structural defects in the execution of DMRC’s civil work and issued a notice to cure, citing faulty construction and deficient designs.[5] Despite DMRC’s remedial efforts and a conditional safety clearance from the Commissioner of Metro Railway Safety (CMRS), DAMEPL issued a termination notice terminating the agreement.[6]
2. The Legal Battle
DMRC challenged the termination before an arbitral tribunal, which ruled in favor of DAMEPL, holding that the defects remained unresolved and justified termination.[7] The award was upheld by a single judge of the Delhi High Court (DHC).[8] However, on appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (A&C Act), a two-judge bench of the DHC set aside the award, finding that the tribunal had overlooked vital evidence.[9] The Division Bench highlighted the significance of the CMRS sanction under the Metro Railways (Operations and Maintenance) Act, 2002 and found that the arbitral tribunal had incorrectly separated the issue of defects and material adverse effects from the issue of the certificate, leading to the overlooking of vital evidence.[10]
DAMEPL appealed to the Supreme Court, which reinstated the award, holding that the tribunal’s interpretation was a possible view, and that the tribunal’s finding that the defects were not cured was a finding of fact which does not warrant interference.[11] DMRC’s review petition was also dismissed.[12] However, in a rare move, the Supreme Court later allowed a curative petition, reversing its earlier decision and affirming the Division Bench’s ruling that set aside the award.[13]
3. Reasoning the Rare: Inside the SC’s Curative Petition Rationale
The Supreme Court assessed the tribunal’s award under Section 34(2-A) of the A&C Act, which allows an award to be set aside if it is vitiated by patent illegality.[14] Relying on Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority,[15] the Supreme Court held that patent illegality arises when an arbitral award is based on an impossible view that no fair-minded person would take.[16] Within this framework, an award is considered perverse, and thus patently illegal, if it (i) relies on no evidence, (ii) considers irrelevant material, or (iii) ignores vital evidence.[17] Consequently, the Supreme Court in DMRC v. DAMEPL reasoned that the tribunal in the present case ignored vital evidence, rendering the award perverse.[18] The reasoning for the said conclusion is delineated below.
3.1. Flawed Framing of Issue H
The Supreme Court held that the tribunal’s erroneous framing of Issue H—“Did the issuance of [a] certificate by CMRS show that the defects were duly cured?”—narrowed the scope of analysis to whether the defects were fully resolved.[19] This flawed framing led to a misinterpretation of Clause 29.5.1(i) (the termination clause). The clause allowed termination only if DMRC failed to cure defects or take effective steps to do so. The tribunal’s aforesaid formulation entirely overlooked the alternative condition under Clause 29.5.1(i): whether effective steps were taken within the cure period. The tribunal wrongly equated these two conditions, concluding that only full defect resolution could prevent termination.[20]
Since the CMRS certificate did not establish complete defect resolution, the tribunal’s answer to the issue was bound to be negative.[21] However, the inclusion of “effective steps” in the clause clearly indicates that incremental progress toward curing defects, even if incomplete, was sufficient to prevent termination.[22] The Court held that the tribunal’s unreasonable interpretation frustrated the intent of the contractual provision, leading to a perverse conclusion that no person of ordinary prudence would accept.[23] A proper assessment should have examined both elements of the clause, ensuring that termination was justified only if neither condition was met.
3.2. Overlooking of Vital Evidence
The Supreme Court held that the arbitral tribunal’s flawed interpretation of Issue H led to the wrongful dismissal of vital evidence concerning the termination.[24] It fundamentally erred in deeming the CMRS certificate irrelevant to the dispute concerning the termination of the agreement.[25] The cure notice that DAMEPL issued was explicitly premised on safety concerns regarding the metro line’s operations.[26] The Court emphasized that the CMRS is the crucial statutory authority under the 2002 Act whose satisfaction regarding safety is necessary for the operation of metro railways.[27] The 2002 Act mandates obtaining a report from the CMRS before the Central Government sanctions the opening of a metro line for public use.[28] Therefore, evidence related to the CMRS’s assessment of the project’s safety and structural integrity was inherently vital.[29] Accordingly, the joint application submitted by both parties to the Commissioner on November 19, 2012, was a vital piece of evidence.[30] This application detailed the repair works undertaken by DMRC and included significant information:[31]
- Inspection and certification of repairs by an independent engineer, M/s. TUV;
- Analysis of cracks by M/s. SYSTRA, concluding no effect on the structural integrity of the girders, along with the repair methodology implemented; and
- Successful completion of train trials by DMRC after repairs, including operation at 120 kmph, with track recording indicating no significant issues. The application explicitly stated that “repairs by DMRC [had] been completed successfully and all systems [had] been checked for correct functioning at various speeds,” including the speed of 120 kmph.
The Supreme Court held that the arbitral tribunal failed to adequately consider the aforesaid ‘effective steps’ taken by DMRC to address the defects, detailed in the joint application seeking the Commissioner’s approval for operation.[32] Lastly, the Supreme Court held that the Tribunal also did not provide a sufficient explanation for why these steps were not considered ‘effective’ under the termination clause.[33]
4. From Bench to Blowback: Reactions to the SC Verdict
By overturning an arbitral award favoring DAMEPL, the Supreme Court has been accused of undermining the sanctity of arbitration in India. Here are some of the reasons for which this judgment has drawn legal ire:
First, the Supreme Court’s intervention is seen as an overreach into the arbitral tribunal’s factual domain. Critics argue that the Court’s reinterpretation of the CMRS certificate’s relevance—deemed vital evidence ignored by the tribunal—amounts to a substantive factual reassessment by reopening and reviewing the evidence.[34] Further, it has been contended that even if the CMRS certificate had been considered, it would have failed to establish that DMRC took “effective steps” to remedy the eight defects cited by DAMEPL within the cure period.[35] Granted on January 18, 2013, the CMRS certificate permitted operations at a reduced speed of 50 km/h (down from the agreed 120 km/h) and acknowledged DMRC’s repairs to certain girders.[36] Critics have argued that these partial repairs addressed only two defects without clarity on whether they occurred within the 90-day cure period, and since no factual finding confirmed both the timeliness and effectiveness of DMRC’s actions, it has been argued that the Supreme Court lacked a firm basis to override the arbitral award.[37]
Second, it has been argued that the Supreme Court mischaracterized the issue regarding the CMRS sanction, treating it as if the tribunal had ignored the sanction rather than as having considered it but finding it unpersuasive.[38] It has thus been argued that the Supreme Court wrongly treated the issue as one of evidence omission rather than its relevance. Based on the said mischaracterisation, a broader concern arises, particularly regarding claims that a tribunal overlooked key evidence. It has been argued that in the UMS Holding[39] case, the English Commercial Court (ECC) emphasised that tribunals are not required to reference every piece of evidence in their reasoning.[40] The ECC outlined four possibilities when evidence is not explicitly mentioned in an award: the tribunal (i) considered it but found it immaterial; (ii) assessed the evidence as unreliable; (iii) misunderstood the evidence; or (iv) overlooked it.[41] Since courts cannot determine with certainty whether a tribunal actually overlooked evidence without re-examining the entire record—effectively turning a review into an appeal—the ECC held that such challenges should rarely succeed.[42] It has been argued that this principle is relevant to the DMRC v. DAMEPL case, where the Supreme Court subjected the arbitral award to a level of scrutiny akin to judicial review of court judgments rather than arbitration awards.[43]
Finally, the use of curative jurisdiction—meant for rare miscarriages of justice—raises eyebrows. Critics contend that it shields state-owned entities like DMRC, hinting at a protectionist bias.[44] It has been argued that this erodes arbitration’s core promise of finality and certainty, potentially deterring investors wary of judicial unpredictability.[45]
While the invocation of curative jurisdiction in an arbitration dispute, resulting in five rounds of court litigation, is indeed concerning, it is important to note that the setting aside of arbitral awards for ignoring vital evidence is not as uncommon as critics suggest.
5. Beyond the Backlash: What Comparative Law Reveals
A comparative legal analysis of arbitration principles in the US and the UK suggests that the Indian Supreme Court’s decision in DMRC v. DAMEPL is not an outlier and aligns with international standards for ensuring fairness in arbitration. Courts in the US and UK have, in some cases, set aside arbitral awards where arbitrators disregarded key evidence or misapplied central legal issues in the dispute.
5.1 Unspoken, Undone: How UK Law Responds to Silence on Vital Points
UK courts maintain a highly deferential approach to arbitration awards but will intervene in exceptional cases where tribunals fail to address essential, fundamental, or crucial aspects of the dispute, as highlighted hereinafter (Section 68(2)(d), Arbitration Act 1996).
A. “Essential Issues” Under Section 68(2)(d)
It is paramount to understand that not every argument or point raised during arbitration qualifies as an ‘issue’ for the purposes of Section 68(2)(d). The courts have consistently held that a tribunal is not obligated to meticulously address each and every submission made by the parties.[46] As affirmed in London Underground Ltd v. Citylink Telecommunications Ltd, this provision is specifically aimed at “those issues the determination of which is essential to a decision on the claims or specific defences raised in the course of the reference.”[47] The failure must be so significant that the “arbitral tribunal has not dealt at all with the case of a party so that substantial injustice has resulted, [e.g.,] where a claim has been overlooked or where the decision cannot be justified as a particular key issue has not been decided that is crucial to the result.”[48]
B. Successful Challenges: When Tribunals Neglect Crucial Determinations
Several cases illustrate when a tribunal’s failure to address essential issues has led to successful challenges under Section 68(2)(d):
B.1 In Kazakhstan v. WWM, the ECC set aside an arbitral award due to the tribunal’s failure to address a pivotal argument—the “Counterfactual Case.”[49] Kazakhstan contended that, irrespective of its alleged breach, the management agreement would have been terminated due to WWM’s failure to meet its financial obligations, meaning the investment was doomed regardless.[50] Despite acknowledging the relevance of this argument, the ECC points out that the tribunal confined its reasoning on loss and causation to a single paragraph—specifically, one sentence—of its extensive award.[51] Justice Bryan found this omission to be a breach of due process under Section 68(2)(d) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, as the tribunal had explicitly committed to resolving disputes based on the evidence and arguments presented.[52] The court ruled that this failure to engage with a determinative issue resulted in substantial injustice, reinforcing the principle that tribunals must fully grapple with all material arguments before them.[53]
B.2 In Metropolitan v. Atmore, the dispute centered on the appropriate valuation method for determining the fair rent of a property.[54] The court held that the arbitrator committed a serious irregularity under Section 68(2)(d) by failing to address a key issue, i.e., the notional tenant’s profit element, which was essential to determining the dispute, and that the failure resulted in substantial injustice, as Metropolitan could be unfairly burdened with excessive rent over an extended period.[55]
B.3 In UK Home Office v. Raytheon, the court found that the arbitral tribunal had failed to address one key critical liability issue and one key quantum issue, amounting to a serious irregularity under Section 68(2)(d).[56] The most significant omission was the tribunal’s failure to engage with the Home Office’s argument that delays in performance were primarily Raytheon’s responsibility.[57] The Home Office had presented extensive evidence on this point, yet the tribunal did not address whether these delays were attributable to Raytheon, despite this issue being central to determining liability.[58] Additionally, the tribunal failed to consider the Home Office’s argument that Raytheon’s damages should not be awarded on a global basis without factoring in Raytheon’s own potential breaches.[59] The court held that these failures amounted to a substantial injustice because the tribunal had not engaged with fundamental issues that were essential to the dispute.[60]
Conclusion
In the UK, to succeed in setting aside an award, the applicant must demonstrate that the tribunal completely failed to address an essential, key, fundamental, or crucial aspect of the dispute that was properly put before it. Furthermore, they must establish that this omission has caused or will cause substantial injustice.
5.2 US Law: The Hoteles Case and Related Jurisprudence – Fair Hearing Principles
A seminal case in US arbitration law that underscores the principle that an arbitral award may be set aside when an arbitrator fails to consider central evidence, thereby depriving a party of a fair hearing, is Hoteles v. Union. In this case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals was called upon to review an arbitral award, which found that the employer failed to show the dismissal was justified and ordered reinstatement and back pay.[61] The company argued that the arbitrator had fundamentally disregarded ‘central and decisive’ evidence that substantiated the reasons for the employee’s dismissal.[62] Agreeing with the company, the First Circuit vacated the arbitration award under 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(a)(3) since “the arbitrator’s refusal to give any weight to the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing, resulted in conduct so improper as to warrant judicial review and to mandate vacatur of the arbitration award.”[63]
Key Aspects of the Hoteles Principle and Subsequent Cases
A. Not Every Exclusion Warrants Vacatur
Mere failure to admit evidence does not automatically require vacatur. Only when the exclusion prejudices a party’s rights by depriving them of a fair hearing will a court intervene.[64]
B. Evidence Must Be ‘Central and Decisive’
Vacatur is justified only if the excluded evidence was critical to the case and its absence fundamentally undermined a party’s ability to present its position. In Hoteles v. Union, the arbitrator completely disregarded the only available evidence (a criminal trial transcript) supporting the employer’s termination decision, effectively denying the employer any meaningful opportunity to prove its case.[65]
C. Prejudice Must Be Concrete, Not Speculative
Subsequent cases clarify that vacatur requires actual prejudice, not just a hypothetical possibility that evidence might have changed the outcome.[66]
D. Distinction from Arbitrator’s Discretion on Weight
Courts in the US defer to arbitrators on evidentiary weight, and mere disagreement over how evidence was evaluated is insufficient for vacatur. However, flat refusal to consider key evidence (as in Hoteles v. Union) crosses the line into misconduct.[67]
E. Current Status of the Principle
Hoteles v. Union has not been overruled and remains a valid precedent. Subsequent cases have required a clear showing of prejudice and emphasized that arbitrators retain broad discretion over evidence to apply the Hoteles principle.[68]
Conclusion
The Hoteles principle establishes that vacatur is warranted only when an arbitrator’s exclusion of evidence is so severe that it denies a party a fair hearing by excluding central and decisive evidence. While later cases have refined its application, the core holding remains intact, reinforcing that arbitration awards may be set aside in exceptional cases of fundamental unfairness.
6. Similarity with DAMEPL Dispute – Bridging Jurisprudence
The Indian Supreme Court’s intervention in DMRC v. DAMEPL hinged on the essential distortion of Issue H, which prevented a proper assessment of whether obtaining the conditional CMRS certificate constituted “effective steps” to cure defects under the Concession Agreement. This procedural flaw aligns with UK Home Office v. Raytheon, Kazakhstan v. WWM, and Metropolitan v. Atmore, all of which involved arbitral tribunals failing to address central issues. In Home Office v. Raytheon, the tribunal overlooked key liability and quantum arguments, undermining the reasoning of the award. In Kazakhstan v. WWM, the tribunal failed to engage with the “Counterfactual Case,” where Kazakhstan argued that the investment would have failed regardless, leading to a breach of due process. Similarly, in Metropolitan v. Atmore, the tribunal’s reasoning lacked internal logic as it disregarded a crucial valuation factor. DMRC v. DAMEPL follows this pattern—the tribunal wrongfully separated the CMRS certificate from the controversy and failed to analyze whether DMRC’s actions, as highlighted in the CMRS application and the certificate, amounted to effective steps to cure the defects.
Notably, ignoring vital evidence, i.e., the joint application to CMRS or the CMRS certificate, when determining whether effective steps were taken to cure the defects, is directly analogous to Hoteles v. Union, where the arbitrator ignored evidence central to the dispute regarding the reasons for termination. In both cases, central and material evidence that should have been integral to the tribunal’s reasoning was omitted, warranting judicial intervention.
As highlighted above, some have argued that the Supreme Court lacked a firm basis to override the arbitral award, pointing to the lack of clarity on whether the repairs mentioned in the CMRS application and certificate fell within the 90-day cure period and whether they sufficiently addressed the defects. However, this critique overlooks the fundamental issue—the arbitral tribunal itself did not make a factual finding on either the timeliness or effectiveness of steps taken by DMRC from the perspective of the CMRS certificate. This gap in reasoning stemmed from the essential misconstruction of Issue H, which treated the CMRS certificate as separate from the controversy. As a result, the award was non-speaking on how the CMRS certificate failed to establish that effective steps were taken, leaving a critical void in the tribunal’s analysis.
Ultimately, DMRC v. DAMEPL exemplifies how procedural flaws—whether through essential misconstruction of key issues or overlooking central evidence—can lead to arbitral awards being scrutinized and potentially set aside. The Supreme Court’s intervention, rather than being an overreach, was a necessary correction of an arbitral failure to engage with a fundamental aspect of the dispute.
Conclusion
The Indian Supreme Court’s ruling in DMRC v. DAMEPL, while having generated discussion and debate, must be understood within the broader context of international arbitration law. The Court’s emphasis on the necessity for arbitral tribunals to diligently consider vital evidence and to accurately frame key legal issues finds strong resonance in the established jurisprudence of arbitration-friendly jurisdictions like the US and the UK. As evidenced by landmark cases such as Hoteles v. Union and the principles articulated in cases like UK Home Office v. Raytheon, courts across these jurisdictions recognize that while deference to arbitral awards is paramount, this deference is not without its limits. Instances where arbitral tribunals fail to give due consideration to central evidence or fundamentally misconstruct the core issues in dispute can constitute grounds for judicial intervention to safeguard the fundamental principles of fairness and reasoned decision-making that underpin the legitimacy of the arbitral process.
[1] DMRC v. DAMEPL, 2024 SCC Online SC 292 (India).
[2] Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha and Convention Center v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34 (1st Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Hoteles v. Union]; Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Raytheon Systems Ltd [2015] EWHC 311[hereinafter UK Home Office v. Raytheon].
[3] DMRC v. DAMEPL, 2024 SCC Online SC 292 (India), ¶ 2.
[4] Id., ¶¶ 2-3.
[5] Id. ¶¶ 6-7.
[6] Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.
[7] Id. ¶¶ 13, 19-22.
[8] Id. ¶ 15.
[9] Id. ¶ 15; DMRC v. DAMEPL, AIR Online 2019 Del 1927 (India), ¶ 98.
[10] DMRC v. DAMEPL, AIR Online 2019 Del 1927 (India), ¶ 97 (xv), (xvii).
[11] DMRC v. DAMEPL, 2021 SCC Online SC 708 (India), ¶¶ 41-42.
[12] DMRC v. DAMEPL, 2024 SCC Online SC 292 (India), ¶ 26.
[13] Id. ¶¶ 71-72.
[14] Arbitration & Conciliation Act, (Act No. 26 of 1996) (India).
[15] Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority, AIR 2015 SC 655 (2014) (India).
[16] DMRC v. DAMEPL, 2024 SCC Online SC 292 (India), ¶ 38.
[17] Id. ¶ 38.
[18] Id. ¶ 71.
[19] Id. ¶ 52.
[20] Id. ¶¶ 48-51.
[21] Id. ¶ 52.
[22] Id. ¶¶ 52-54.
[23] Id. ¶ 51.
[24] Id. ¶ 55.
[25] Id. ¶ 56.
[26] Id. ¶ 60.
[27] Id. ¶¶ 61-62.
[28] Id. ¶ 62.
[29] Id. ¶ 63.
[30] Id. ¶ 57.
[31] Id. ¶ 57.
[32] Id. ¶ 65.
[33] Id. ¶ 66.
[34] Sarthak Raizada, How Many Bites of the Same Cherry Does it Take to Overturn an Arbitration Award? Unpacking the Indian Supreme Court’s Decision in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, (July 10, 2024), https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/
arbitration-blog/how-many-bites-of-the-same-cherry-does-it-take-to-overturn-an-arbitration-award-unpacking-the-indian-supreme-courts-decision-in-delhi-metro-rail-corporation-v-delhi-airport-metro-express-pvt-ltd/.
[35] Kartik Kalra, Sovereign Immunity, in Other Words? On the Indian Supreme Court’s (Final) Judgment in the Delhi Metro Arbitration Saga, The Penn State Law Arbitration Law Review Blog (Brandan Parks ed.) (Dec. 2, 2024), https://sites.psu.edu/arbitrationlawreview/2024/12/02/sovereign-immunity-in-other-words-on-the-indian-supreme-courts-final-judgment-in-the-delhi-metro-arbitration-saga/.
[36] Id.
[37] Id.
[38] Raizada, supra note 35.
[39] UMS Holding Ltd & Ors v. Great Station Properties SA & Anor [2017] EWHC 2398 (Comm) [hereinafter UMS Holding].
[40] Raizada, supra note 35.
[41] UMS Holding, ¶ 28.
[42] Id.
[43] Raizada, supra note 35.
[44] Kalra, supra note 36.
[45] Supreme Court’s judgment in Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. vs. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd: A setback for arbitration in India?, Acuity Law (Jan. 6, 2025), https://acuitylaw.co.in/supreme-courts-judgment-in-delhi-metro-rail-corporation-ltd-vs-delhi-airport-metro-express-pvt-ltd-a-setback-for-arbitration-in-india/.
[46] Fidelity Management S.A. and others v. Myriad International Holdings BV and other [2005] EWHC 1193, ¶ 3.
[47] London Underground Ltd v. Citylink Telecommunications Ltd [2007] EWHC 1749 (TCC), ¶ 41.
[48] Id.
[49] Republic of Kazakhstan v. World Wide Minerals Ltd and others [2025] EWHC 452 (Comm), ¶ 143 [hereinafter Kazakhstan v. WWM].
[50] Kazakhstan v. WWM, ¶ 51.
[51] Id. ¶ 63.
[52] Id. ¶ 151.
[53] Id. ¶ 150.
[54] Metropolitan Property Realizations Ltd v. Atmore Investments Ltd [2008] EWHC 2925 (Ch), ¶ 1 [hereinafter Metropolitan v. Atmore].
[55] Id. ¶ 23.
[56] UK Home Office v. Raytheon, ¶ 14.
[57] Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
[58] Id. ¶ 17.
[59] Id. ¶ 13.
[60] Id. ¶ 1.
[61] Hoteles v. Union, 763 F.2d 34, 37.
[62] Id. at 40.
[63] Id. at 42.
[64] Id. at 40.
[65] Id.
[66] See, e.g., Doral Fin. Corp. v. Garcia-Velez, No. 12-1519, at 13-14 (1st Cir. 2013).
[67] See, e.g., Dialysis Access Center, LLC v. RMS Lifeline, Inc., No. 17-2014, at 15-16 (1st Cir. 2019).
[68] See, e.g., Ameriprise Fin. Servs. v. Brady, 325 F.Supp.3d 219, 227-228 (D. Mass. 2018),
*Devanshu Sajlan is a Judge in the Delhi Judicial Services. A gold medalist from the National Law University, Delhi, he began his career at AZB & Partners, one of India’s leading law firms, and later worked with Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Senior Advocate, before joining the judiciary. He was awarded the prestigious Fulbright-Nehru Master’s Fellowship to pursue an LL.M. at Columbia Law School, where he graduated with High Honors (awarded to the top ten percent of the class). His research interests include international arbitration, white collar crimes, and the rights of marginalised communities.